Book Review: The Uncontrolling Love of God by Thomas Jay Oord

Oord, Thomas Jay. The Uncontrolling Love of God: An Open and Relational Account of Providence. Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2015. ★★★★☆

Thomas Jay Oord is, for me, one of the most compelling open/relational theologians writing today. His particular construction of open theology resolves some of the serious problems that arise in the work of other open theologians. He accomplished this in his 2010 book The Nature of Love: A Theology, by seeking to lay out a coherent theology that revolves around love. In his new book The Uncontrolling Love of God, he uses his theology of love to address the issue of providence, particularly as it pertains to the problem of evil.

He begins in chapter one by claiming that "tragedy needs explanation." If we have any theology, it needs to reckon with the evil and suffering we experience in concrete reality. He names this concrete reality by telling several stories that involve atrocities no good theologian could bear to overlook in addressing the question of evil and providence. Wherever our analysis goes in the forthcoming pages, he says, we must refer back to these stories as the standard for whether or not our theology is compelling.

In the second chapter, he discusses the inherent randomness of life, referring to experience and to science. His discussion of randomness based on science is more compelling than that of experience, (I will return to his treatment of experience in my overview of chapter three) but his overall point is a good one—to demonstrate that, empirically, we don't consider the universe as determined. Scientists recognize elements of unpredictability in the established order, and we in our experience assume such unpredictability.

But randomness, he says, is only one side of the coin. The other consists of life's "regularities"—such as, laws of nature, and morality. These regularities show that the universe is not altogether unpredictable, but is rather partly open and partly determined.

In chapter three, Oord deals with the topic of free agency. He applies his partly-open-partly-determined view of the universe to the human's free will. Humans are not absolutely free, he says, because we, by nature, have limited options:

We all know that we cannot do just anything we might imagine. For instance, we cannot fly to Mars this afternoon. We cannot change from being humans and become toads. We cannot all be president at once. We cannot freely put the entire moon in our basements. There are many things we cannot do, so skeptics say we must not be free at all. They seem to define free will as choosing among unlimited options and having no constraints. (58)

My criticism of this passage is that Oord does not provide an example of a "skeptic" who, seeing that a human can't become a toad, claims humans have no freedom at all. This seems like an exaggeration of the skeptic's case against free will. The passage also seems like a very conservative analysis of the human's limited options. What of the limitations placed on us because of our cultural conditioning, i.e. our presuppositions, established categories, inherent cognitive framework, etc.? Oord's silence regarding human situaded-ness makes me wonder if he thinks a human can assess options in an unmediated manner.

This leads to my next criticism of Oord's chapter on freedom--his argument from 'experience':

The most powerful evidence for free will is our own personal experience. In the way we act, we all inevitably presuppose we are, at least to some degree, free. I call this an experiential nonnegotiable. (60) 

Free will is an experiential nonnegotiable, and our personal experiences tell us something true about the nature of reality. (61)

I sympathize with this approach, while, however, not being uncritical of it. I sympathize with it because, at the end of the day, we are dependent on our experience to receive any information about the material world—so much so that it is even possible the "material world" is an illusion! I am critical of it, however, because it neglects the possibility that we could be misled by our experience, that the Truth could be much different than what our experience leads us to believe.

Why does Oord think we can trust our experience regarding questions of ultimate significance? Is our experience not mediated by cultural conditioning, evolutionary conditioning, and finite scope? If I were to, for example, deem my shirt blue, I would, in Oord's mind, be justified because my experience tells me my shirt is blue. However, we know that the colors we see aren't descriptive of the objects our minds attach to them, independently of our perception. A humorous example of this, with a blue and black dress, recently went viral. The dress was blue and black, but that didn't stop thousands from seeing it as white and gold.

If Oord's argument for free agency is personal experience, I think it is in trouble, because I don't think personal experience can be used as valid evidence of ultimate truth.

Oord also discusses "the problem of good" in chapter three. He says that, while theists have to reckon with evil, atheists have to reckon with good. "The problem of good is a real problem for unbelievers," he says (68). His only justification for this claim, however, is the assumption that phenomena must have explanations. If something is good, you have to explain why it is possible for good to exist in the world. But why do you have to explain it? He says "to make sense of life" (69), but he assumes that life is ours to make sense of, and I do not think this is a valid assumption. Already, in whatever ancient year it was, the book of Job claimed that the proper posture toward the chaotic abyss of the universe was humility and uncertainty. I think this might be a better framework than Oord's necessity of making sense of life.

In chapter four, Oord provides a helpful overview of different theologies of divine providence, complete with the problems he sees in various ones. They are too numerous to repeat here, but suffice it to say, Oord's overview is widely encompassing and well-balanced.

Chapter five includes Oord's overview of open and relational theology. He avoids merely repeating what has been published several times by including authors which have not normally seen the light of scholarship, such as Lorenzo D. McCabe, T. W. Brents, Jules Lequyer, Uriah Smith, and Edgar S. Brightman. Open theologians have much to uncover in the history of open and relational theology, and a lot of uncovered material to analyse, and it is commendable for Oord to begin to do so here.

Also included in chapter five is a fair comparison of process theology and open theology, as well as a helpful overview of the ways in which science has been in dialogue with open theology.

Perhaps the best chapter is the following one, which deals with John Sanders' theology of providence. In The Nature of Love, Oord looked at Clark Pinnock's theology, laying out in what ways it is strong and similar to his own, and explaining what he thinks its inadequacies are. He does the same with Sanders, and his criticism of Sanders ends up being quite similar to his criticism of Pinnock. That is, they both claim that God's is omnipotent and could always intervene to stop evil but often allows it to happen so that humans can be free. Oord, in both accounts, does a very good job of revealing how problematic these claims are. "The one who could stop genuine evil by restraining the perpetrator of evil," he says, "is morally responsible—or better, culpable—for permitting the painful consequences" (142-143)—and I could not agree more. He compellingly demonstrates that, in Sanders' theology, love does not come first.

For those who are familiar with Oord's work, there are no real surprises in the seventh chapter, for in it Oord offers his alternative to the models of God's providence he analyzed throughout the book—his "essential kenosis" theology, which claims that God is necessarily limited in power because it is in God's loving nature as a creator to share power with creatures. While as an a/theologian I find it ultimately unsatisfying (for reasons too complicated to go into here), Oord's "essential kenosis" theology remains, for me, the most compelling construction of open theology to date.

Oord's final chapter deals with the question of miracles. Orthodox Christians—including open theists, such as Sanders—often object to Oord's theology by pointing to miracles, which seem to them to be examples of God's unilateral activity. He has responded to this objection before, but here he dives into it in a more extensive manner. While an interesting assessment of the topic, I don't think Oord's response to the problem of miracles will sway his critics. I think he would do better to dialogue with historical-critical biblical scholarship on the subject, but part of Oord's project seems to be trying to keep an orthodox theology in tact while following his theological convictions. It is a noble task, even if a troublesome one.

Book Review: "The Nature of Love: A Theology" by Thomas Jay Oord

Oord, Thomas Jay. The Nature of Love: A Theology. St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2010. $22.49. pp.vii-195. ISBN 978-0-827208-28-5. ★★★★★

In his book The Nature of Love: A Theology, Thomas Jay Oord seeks to construct a theology centered around the defining element of God's nature: love. In his introduction, he highlights the demeaned role love has played in theology, and understands well the reasons for this. For example, he recognizes the difficulty of building a theology of love given the loose definition of the word. In spite of the often undefined nature of love, he provides a well-rounded and helpful definition, the essential element of which is promoting overall well-being.

After his introduction, he has four sections. The first deals with Agape, the second with Eros, and the third with Philia. The three together encapsulate what love is to Oord. Agape, he says, is love in spite of; Eros is love because of; and Philia is love alongside of. In each section, he deals with an interpretation of one of the love forms that he subjects to critical analysis. His discussion of Agape dialogues with Anders Nygren. In the Eros chapter, he deals with Augustine. With Philia, he talks about the theology of Clark Pinnock. The last chapter of the book is dedicated to laying out his "Essential Kenosis" theology of love.

The Agape and Eros chapters are very strong. He exposes the flaws of Nygren's and Augustine's ideas about love. Nygren essentially said that love means self-sacrifice, and that humans do not love, but God is the one loving through us. Augustine said that love is either enjoyment of something for its own sake, or enjoyment of something for the sake of something else. He also believed that God is the only one who should be loved, and that we should love others for the sake of loving God, instead of loving others for their own sakes. While their ideas of love involve much more, this provides a general idea of what Oord was arguing against. And his arguments against these views are quite convincing. He completely dismantles the validity of their claims, and in a cool and collective way. I've seen Oord speak before, and I was struck by his charm and the smoothness of his presentation. This demeanor is present in his book. He describes the views of Nygren and Augustine as 'insufficient' while the reader thinks 'ridiculous'.

The chapter dedicated to Clark Pinnock is not quite as strong as the previous two. As he lays out Pinnock's Open theology, it's almost like he's making a case for it, which is to be expected since his Essential Kenosis theology lines up with Open theology on many issues. But there is one crucial difference: Pinnock said that God sometimes coerces, and Oord believes the God of love never coerces.

The problem with Pinnock's thinking, Oord says, is that God has the ability to prevent evil but doesn't, which is why Pinnock fails to resolve the problem of evil. Included in his discussion of coercion is a discussion of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo--creation out of nothing. Oord says creatio ex nihilo, which Pinnock embraced, implies coercion. He uses this to justify dedicating a section of his book to refuting creatio ex nihilo. However, I don't think it fits well with the rest of the book. He doesn't really explain how exactly creation out of nothing implies coercion, and his alternative understanding of creation is not given the extensive explanation that it warrants. It almost seems like he put it in there so that he could have another thing to critique Pinnock on.

The ideas present in Oord's Essential Kenosis theology that distinguish it from other theologies are fascinating and worth consideration. He says that since God's nature is love, he loves others necessarily. In this, there is no divine self-limitation to provide freedom for creatures; God necessarily provides freedom for creatures because it is his nature as love to do so. I find this concept compelling, and while he can be and probably often has been accused of down-playing the omnipotence of God, I think his theology provides a better approach to the problem of evil than theologies that claim that God can and sometimes does unilaterally intervene to prevent evil, but most of the time thinks human freedom is more important than preventing evil. While I advocate Greg Boyd's warfare worldview, Oord makes significant contributions to the theodicy discussion.

It is difficult to write a review of this book because so much is said in it and I have so many things to respond to. Being concise is something Oord does well; he says a lot in a small amount of space. The Nature of Love is a short book, but it covers a multitude of topics (though, a few of them could use more elaboration). He gives the reader a lot to think about.

Oord has presented a robust and reasonable theology of love, which resolves problems that other theologies bring up, without creating too many of its own. He also provides a good platform for dialogue between Open theists and Process theists. His book is very thought-provoking and it brings to the table ideas that need to be given significant attention in addressing God's nature as love.

Purchase "The Nature of Love: A Theology" on Amazon (here)

Petitionary Prayer: What is it Good for?

Prayer is often thought to be something that doesn't affect what will actually turn out. Because God already knows what he is going to do, so it is said, prayer is for our benefit, our own change, rather than changing what will occur.

Prayer is also often treated like a vending machine; insert a prayer, out comes a blessing. God is a genie in a bottle, to whom we can go to with any request for him to fill.

With these construals of prayer, it is widely taken for granted or trivialized. I often get the feeling in prayer groups that we're all praying for stuff to happen but we don't actually think anything is going to come from it.

Prayer has become a ritual to which we ascribe power on a surface level, but we don't use it in such a way that we take seriously the power it has.

A problem I think we have is that we pray without acknowledging any limits to our prayers, resulting in unrealistic prayers. Treating God like a genie in a bottle who can do anything for us trivializes prayer, because it doesn't ring true. We don't experience prayer that way. I do not experience the effectiveness of my prayers the same way I experience the effectiveness of a dollar when I use it to buy a Coke from a vending machine. Because of the dissonance between idea and experience--between what is thought about prayer and what the reality is--the power of prayer is demeaned, and prayer becomes just something that we do. Ask for it in prayer because that's what Christians do, but don't expect anything.

I think this trivialization could be changed if we thought about prayer more realistically. In an attempt to do so, I would like to highlight a couple of major limitations on prayer that we seldom acknowledge.

Disclaimer: Talk of what God can or cannot do must not be taken to mean I am questioning God's actual ability. I assume God's omnipotence. However, there are certain things God cannot do within the framework which he himself has set--that is, within the boundaries he set on himself and the natural order. There's a difference between the power God possesses and the power he exercises.

1. God cannot violate the free will of human beings

By saying 'Yes' to free will for humans, God inevitably said 'No' to absolute control; he chose to give humans quite a bit of control over what occurs. Thus, when we pray, we must take into account that God cannot just do anything we ask of him. Consider David Basinger's words:

God so values the inherent integrity of significant human freedom . . . that he will not as a general rule force his created moral agents to perform actions that they do not freely desire to perform. . . . [I] doubt that he would override the freedom of one individual primarily because he was freely asked to do so by another.(1)

For example, if a friend of mine is going into a job interview, I cannot realistically pray that God will simply have the employer hire him/her, as if God is going to overrule the employer's free will and give my friend a job. Put yourself in the employer's position; would God override your freedom and control your actions to accomplish a certain end?

We do not see God doing this in Scripture. Consider these examples:

All day long I have held out my hands to an obstinate people, who walk in ways not good, pursuing their own imaginations. Isaiah 65:2

I take no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but rather that they turn from their ways and live. Turn! Turn from your evil ways! Why will you die, people of Israel?' Ezekiel 33:11

Jerusalem, Jerusalem, you who kill the prophets and stone those sent to you, how often I have longed to gather your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were not willing. Matthew 23:37

The Pharisees and the experts in the law rejected God's purpose for themselves. Luke 7:30

You stiff-necked people! Your hearts and ears are still uncircumcised. You are just like your ancestors: You always resist the Holy Spirit! Acts 7:51

These verses point to the reality of human freedom, and how often that freedom can oppose the will of God; and if God wants people to have freedom, there's only so much he can do in a particular situation.

2. God cannot violate the free will of spiritual beings

This one is often overlooked by Christians, but it's a big one. Walter Wink says,

Prayer involves not just God and people, but God and people and the Powers. What God is able to do in the world is hindered, to a considerable extent, by the rebelliousness, resistance, and self-interest of the Powers exercising their freedom under God.(2)

A striking example of this is found in Daniel 10, in which an angel comes to Daniel in a vision and says:

Do not be afraid, Daniel. Since the first day that you set your mind to gain understanding and to humble yourself before your God, your words were heard, and I have come in response to them. But the prince of the Persian kingdom resisted me twenty-one days. Then Michael, one of the chief princes, came to help me, because I was detained there with the king of Persia. vv.12-13

This passage tells us that, when Daniel prayed, an angel was dispatched to meet his need, but was held up by an evil being! And it was so bad that had to call in for back-up. This, he says, is why it took so long for Daniel's prayer to be addressed.

Have you ever heard that passage talked about in a sermon on prayer? It gives us an incredibly different picture of the power of prayer than the one we so often engage. Prayer is not simply asking God for things. Prayer is spiritual warfare! Our prayers are spiritual contributions to the victory of the kingdom of God over evil. With prayer, we add oil to the Kingdom fire.

An Alternative View of Prayer

God is always doing everything he can to bring good out of every situation (Rom. 8:28). Terence Fretheim notes that to say God intervenes is a mistake, because it implies, "that God is not normally present but intervenes now and then with a goody or a baddy."(3) Subjectively, it may seem like God intervenes, but in such cases, our eyes are being opened to what God is always doing, or trying to do. As Greg Boyd says, "God sovereignly influences the whole process, working to bring about as much good and to prevent as much evil as possible."(4) William Hasker describes several ways God does this:

There are circumstances which God is able to arrange. There are the influences coming from other persons who are in tune with God's purposes in a situation. And above all, there is the 'internal operation of the Holy Spirit,' working within a person's mind and will in ways we only dimly understand. God respects us, but he does not 'leave us alone' to make our decision in isolation from his loving concern for us.(5)

Given this framework, our prayers create opportunity through which God can work; they create possibilities that were not possible before we prayed. As Boyd says,

By God's own design, [prayer] functions as a crucial constituent in the 'givens' of any particular situation that makes it possible for God more intensely to steer a situation to his desired end.(6)

Or, in Fretheim's words, "prayers make available to God some new ingredients . . . with which to work the divine will into a situation."(7) Put another way, Clark Pinnock says that prayer "expands God's effective presence in the world."(8) This is what we provide as vessels of the Holy Spirit.

Challenge

When you pray, think about how you are praying. Consider the fact that your prayer actually has power to affect what happens, and let that acknowledgement inspire you to pray realistically, taking the free wills of others into account.

This may sound like it limits prayer, but I think if we begin to pray realistically, we will start to pray more fervently and effectively, because it will teach us to pray for things in such a way that we acknowledge our prayer can affect what happens, instead of merely praying ritualistically.

Acknowledging parameters on how we pray will keep us from taking prayer for granted or trivializing it, and will expand our understanding of the power of prayer.

For further reading:
Gregory A. Boyd, "Praying in the Whirlwind," in Satan and the Problem of Evil (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 209-241.
Terence Fretheim, "Divine Dependence on the Human: An Old Testament Perspective." Ex Auditu 13 (1997): 1-13.
Vincent Brümmer, "Praying for Things to Happen," in What Are We Doing When We Pray? rev. ed. (Burlington, Ashgate, 2008), 33-81.

Notes:
(1) David Basinger, "Practical Implications," in The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 160-161.
(2) Walter Wink, Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 311.
(3) This was said in a presentation Terence Fretheim gave called "Divine-Human Relationship," which can be found on Itunes U. 
(4) Gregory A. Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 237.
(5) William Hasker, Providence, Evil and the Openness of God (New York: Routledge, 2004), 224.
(6) Boyd, 231.
(7) Terence Fretheim, "Divine Dependence on the Human: An Old Testament Perspective." Ex Auditu 13 (1997), 2.
(8) Clark Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God's Openness (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), 173.

A Theology of Genesis 2: Yahweh in Relationship

There are many ancient Near Eastern creation narratives, with many similarities to those in the Hebrew Bible.(1) It is for this reason, among many others, that I have found it impossible to view the creation accounts in Genesis as literal history of how the world was actually brought into being.(2) Accepting this has caused me to view Genesis 1-3 much differently: If the purpose of these narratives was not to record actual history, what was the purpose? What were the authors of these narratives trying to say through them? I am not interested in answering these questions here. What I am most interested in is what these narratives say about God; and in this study, I have set out to address what Genesis 2, in particular, says about God.

Genesis 2 and the Ancient Near East

My main purpose here is to give life to the uniqueness of the God of Israel, showing what differentiates him from the gods of the other ancient Near Eastern creation stories. Before I do this, I should share with you some of the commonalities between Genesis 2 and other creation accounts. These are pulled from Peter Enns' book The Evolution of Adam:

• "A garden/paradise of God/the gods in the east (Enki and Ninhursag; Gilgamesh)
• Humans created out of dust/clay to cultivate the land (Enki and Ninmah [Sumerian]; Atrahasis; Gilgamesh)
• Humans infused with the Breath of Life (Instructions of Merikare [Egyptian]) . . .
• Streams of water supply irrigation to the garden (Enki and Ninhursag) . . .
• The female made from the male's rib/side (Enki and Ninhursag [referring to a goddess])"(3)

These are not all the similarities, nor would it benefit this study to go through all of them. The point is: Genesis 2 is not completely unique. My concern, then, is how unique Yahweh of Genesis 2 is.

I contend that Yahweh's uniqueness is found in his relationality with the people of Israel (I agree with Enns that Adam & Eve represent Israel in the story).

Yahweh, a God of Relationship

Terence Fretheim provides several characteristics of genuine divine-human relationship:(4)

• The Yahweh-Israel relationship is such that Yahweh is not the only one with something to say
• It is also a relationship in which Yahweh is not the only one with something to do and the power to do it
• Yahweh is genuinely affected by the relationship
• Yahweh is concerned about the human's entire self
• In this relationship, the human will can stand against the will of Yahweh
• The Yahweh-Israel relationship is one in which the future is not all mapped out

All of these characteristics can be found in Genesis 2.

Yahweh is genuinely affected by the relationship and is concerned about the creature's entire self

We begin this section with an astute observation by Bill Arnold:

Gen. 1 portrays the transcendent and sovereign Creator commanding order from chaos by a series of cuts and separations, structuring the world and its inhabitants according to types and categories. Now, 2:4–25 complements that portrait with one in which the immanent and intensely personal Yahweh Elohim, LORD God, shapes humanity from clay like a potter (2:7).(5)

The image of God as potter, says Fretheim, "reveals a God who focuses closely on the object to be created and takes painstaking care to shape each one into something useful and beautiful."(6) Indeed, the human is "fearfully and wonderfully made" (Ps. 139:14): Yahweh pays acute attention to detail in creating humanity, cautiously engaging in the art of perfecting his craft. This is a God who genuinely cares about humans, unlike the gods of the ancient Near East, to whom the creation of humanity was either an afterthought or an act of selfish gain.(7)

The God depicted in Genesis 2 cares that ādām is alone and wants to provide someone for him (v.18) so that he can be a relational being as Yahweh is ("let us," 1:26).(8) Yahweh is deeply affected by his relationship with humans, and is concerned about their entire selves.

Yahweh is not the only one with something to say; nor is he the only one with something to do and the power to do it

Fretheim says, "Twice, God 'brings' a creature [to the man] . . . [and] lets the human being determine whether [they] . . . are adequate to move the evaluation from 'not good' to 'good.'"(9) Indeed, in verse 23, it is ādām that determines that the creation is good. This reveals that Yahweh wants to receive input from his creatures. He wants their involvement in his creation. In the God-human relationship, Yahweh is not the only being with something to say.

That Yahweh made it so that he was not the only one with something to do and the power to do it can be seen in the incredible responsibility he gives ādām to name all the animals. This might not seem significant to us, but, as Gerhard von Rad provides , "name-giving in the ancient Orient was primarily an exercise of sovereignty."(10) "Without any qualification in the text," Fretheim observes, "whatever the human being called each animal, that was its name (2:19). Whatever!"(11)

Furthermore, Arnold states that by "pronouncing the name of each [animal] as they were created, the human participated in the creative process with God."(12) As Fretheim says, in Genesis 2, "Divine decisions interact with human decisions in the creation of the world."(13) Andre Jolles powerfully conveys the significance of this name-giving:

Man attacks the confusion of the world; by probing, restricting and combining he brings together what belongs together. That which lies piled up in the confusion of the world does not at the start possess its own form; but rather, what is here distinguished with discrimination receives its own form only as it comes together in the analysis.(14

This paints Yahweh as a God who shares power with his creatures. He genuinely cares about what the humans want to do and gives them the power to do it. As Phyllis Trible states, God here is not portrayed as "the authoritarian controller of events but as the generous delegator of power who even forfeits the right to reverse human decisions."(15) Fretheim echoes this, saying "the divine sovereignty in creation is understood, not in terms of absolute divine control, but as a sovereignty that gives power over to the created for the sake of a relationship of integrity."(16)

To step out of our present chapter for a second and go to the first creation narrative, we find a fascinating verse, in which Elohim says to the humans: "Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth and conquer it, and hold sway over the fish of the sea and the fowl of the heavens and every beast that crawls upon the earth" (1:28). The Hebrew words for 'conquer' and 'hold sway' denote sovereignty, "an absolute or even fierce exercise of mastery."(17) Consider the powerful claims of Ps. 8:5-8:

...you have made [human beings] a little lower than God,
and crowned them with glory and honor.
You have given them dominion over the works of your hands;
you have put all things under their feet,
all sheep and oxen,
and also the beasts of the field,
the birds of the air, and the fish of the sea,
whatever passes along the paths of the seas.

Clearly, Yahweh's purpose was not to be the only being with something to do and the power with which to do it.

The human will can stand against the will of Yahweh

This is evident in the "vocation, permission, and prohibition" that Yahweh gives the humans:(18) "From every fruit of the garden you may surely eat. But from the tree of knowledge, good and evil, you shall not eat, for on that day you eat from it, you are doomed to die" (vv.16b-17) The humans can eat all they want from any tree of the garden, but they are forbidden to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Furthermore, the humans were created to till and watch over the earth (v.15), to rule over it (1:28). Walter Brueggemann has observed that, today, the "divine will for vocation and freedom has been lost. The God of the garden is chiefly remembered as the one who prohibits. But the prohibition makes sense only in terms of the other two."(19) Yahweh gave the humans power and freedom, but also a warning of what happens when that power is abused. This warning would be nonsensical if the human will could not stand against Yahweh's will. Here is a God who does not always get his way.

Yahweh shares power, gives freedom, risks his will, and submits to the possibility of opposition. The human will can stand against his.

In the Yahweh-Israel relationship, the future is not all mapped out in advance

"The two trees," Fretheim says, "represent two possible futures: life and death."(20) This motif of two possible futures is found throughout the Hebrew Bible. Here is an example:

This is what the Lord says: Do what is just and right. Rescue from the hand of the oppressor the one who has been robbed. Do no wrong or violence to the foreigner, the fatherless or the widow, and do not shed innocent blood in this place. For if you are careful to carry out these commands, then kings who sit on David’s throne will come through the gates of this palace, riding in chariots and on horses, accompanied by their officials and their people. But if you do not obey these commands, declares the Lord, I swear by myself that this palace will become a ruin.
Jeremiah 22:3-5

What humanity's future will look like is up to their decisions: "All depends on what the humans do with what God presents."(21) Yahweh as revealed in Genesis 2 does not have a blueprint of his will for human history; he leaves human history is up to humans. The image of divine potter in Jeremiah 18 shows a God who adapts to the decisions of his people, not a God who decides their future himself. Is it a coincidence that the potter image can be found in the narrative of creation, the beginning of human history (2:7)?

"O Lord, Who is Like You?"

In Genesis 2, God is not a fully transcendent, self-glorifying figure. His first act as Creator is not to demand worship from the creatures; rather, he focuses on them the whole time! He selflessly gives the human freedom, adheres to the human's needs, receives input from the human, and gives the human power. Genesis 2 reveals that Yahweh, unlike the gods of the ancient Near Eastern creation stories, is concerned with being intimately involved with his people, and sharing with them a genuine relationship, the sustaining of which depends on all of these qualities.(22)

[Read Paul Imbrone's response to this here]

Notes:
(1) For similarities between ancient Near Eastern texts and the Hebrew Bible, see Kenton Sparks, Ancient Texts for the Study of the Hebrew Bible (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2005); John Walton, Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006); Walton, Ancient Israelite Literature in its Cultural Context (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994); and J.J.M. Roberts, The Bible and the Ancient Near East: Collected Essays (Eisenbrauns, 2002).
(2) For other reasons, see Peter Enns, The Evolution of Adam (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2012).
(3) Ibid., 55.
(4) These come from a presentation Terence Fretheim gave called "Divine-Human Relationship." This can be found on Itunes U. All but one of the listed characteristics can also be found in his book, God and World in the Old Testament: A Relational Theology of Creation (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2005), 21-22.
(5) Bill T. Arnold, Genesis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 56.
(6) Fretheim, "Genesis," in The New Interpreter's Bible: Volume 1, ed. Leander E. Keck: 319-674 (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), 349.
(7) Arnold, 58.
(8) See Fretheim, God and World, 56.
(9) Fretheim, "Genesis," 352.
(10) Gerhard von Rad, Genesis: A Commentary (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1973), 81.
(11) Fretheim, God and World, 58.
(12) Arnold, 60.
(13) Fretheim, God and World, 58.
(14) Andre Jolles, quoted in von Rad, 80-81.
(15) Phyllis Trible, quoted in Fretheim, "Genesis," 352.
(16) Ibid., 356.
(17) Robert Alter, Genesis: Translation and Commentary (New York: W.W Norton & Co., 1996), 5.
(18) See Walter Brueggemann, Genesis (Lousiville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1982), 46.
(19) Ibid.
(20) Fretheim, "Genesis," 352.
(21) Ibid., 357.
(22) Walton also recognizes this unique quality. See his Ancient Near Eastern Thought and the Old Testament, 110.

What C.S. Lewis Got Wrong, Part 2

I continue my assessment of C.S. Lewis' theology of God and time. Lewis believed that God does not
experience moment-by-moment succession but sees past, present, and future all at once in the "eternal now." In Part 1 (here), I discussed this concept philosophically, and concluded that it is logically impossible. Here, I will discuss the concept biblically.

A friend of mine posed the following question in response to Part 1: "is the problem with eternalism eternalism itself, or the limited scope of our minds?" Indeed, many would argue that the fact that the eternal now concept seems impossible to us doesn't mean it's not the reality for God. His intelligence is far greater than ours and his eternal essence is incompatible with our finite minds. For this reason, many believe it because it doesn't make sense. I have a few things to say to this:

1) That very well may be the case. However, we then have to ask, on what authority do we conceive of this idea? If it is in Scripture, then, yes, we do have to accept it whether it makes sense or not. However, it isn't in Scripture, and Lewis himself recognizes this.(1) So then, did God tell Lewis how he relates with time? Did he explain to him what it means to be eternal? What requires us to believe that this is the view we must accept?

2) Lewis said this theology is simply what makes sense to him.(2) He is appealing only to his finite mind. Likewise, the concept was introduced because it seemed like the logical way an eternal being would "relate" to time. Why must we accept a view that only comes from the minds of men?

3) The fact that Lewis appealed only to his reason makes the view posed at the beginning of this blog quite ironic given the fact that the eternal now concept was thought up by philosophers using reason to understand how an eternal being would relate to time. The truth is, we cannot know how God relates to time. Though Lewis would most likely agree, I think he is too presumptuous in his musings, especially since he does not appeal to any higher authority. Christian theology should ultimately come from Scripture. We should be very cautious of developing concepts of God that aren't in Scripture.

Does Scripture Point to an Understanding of God and Time?

I do not claim to know the proper answer to this question, as I am not an eternal being and have no knowledge of what an eternal being is actually like. However, I do think there is enough to go off of in Scripture to say without a doubt that God does at least experience moment-by-moment succession. I do not have the space or the inclination to make a complete case for this, but I will provide several examples that show that the eternal now concept is incompatible with the biblical accounts, and that God does experience time.(3)

What if God, willing to demonstrate his wrath and to make known his power, endured with much patience vessels of wrath made ready for destruction?
Romans 9:22

Really, this discussion could stop at the mention of God's patience, for a god who does not experience time cannot experience patience. If anything implies time, it is patient endurance. The word means long-suffering. If God experiences past, present, and future all at once in the eternal now, he absolutely does not endure anything with much patience. We should know from the culture in which we live that 'Now' is completely incompatible with patience. Not only does enduring something with much patience imply moving from one second to the next, it implies experiencing a considerable amount of moment-by-moment succession. God cannot be both long-suffering and timeless.

I thought,
How I would set you among my sons,
and give you a pleasant land,
a heritage most beautiful of all nations.
And I thought you would call me, My Father,
and would not turn from following me.
Surely, as a treacherous wife leaves her husband,
so have you been treacherous to me, O house of Israel.
Jeremiah 3:19-20

In this chapter, we see a before-and-after occurrence with God. Before, he thought he would bless them, but now he has to deal with their rebellion. This could not be possible if God was timeless and the past and future were both present to him. God would not experience a before-and-after; there would only be now.

Perhaps they will listen and everyone will turn from his evil way, that I may repent of the calamity which I am planning to do to them because of the evil of their deeds.
Jeremiah 26:3

Perhaps they will listen? that I may? repent? A God who is in past, present, and future now does not say 'perhaps', because that implies that what he is experiencing precedes something else. His supposing that his people will listen precedes their listening or ignoring. If God existed in the time in which they chose whether or not to listen to him while simultaneously existing at the time when he said this, he wouldn't say it! Not only would he know when he said it that they wouldn't listen, but he would see them not listening.

Likewise, an eternal now God does not change his mind and relent on something he was planning on doing, because, again, there is no before-and-after with him. A timeless God does not plan to do something at one point and then change the plan at another; his plan simply is now.

I could go on and on, verse after verse, because throughout Scripture we can see God experiencing time, and, furthermore, no one in Scripture has any problem with it, unlike the philosophers who thought that the idea of God relating with the world--let alone within time--would point to an imperfection in his nature.

The Omni-Resourceful God

Lewis begins his chapter "Time and Beyond Time" by addressing an issue concerning prayer: a man told him that he could believe in God but could not swallow "the idea of Him attending to several hundred million human beings who are all addressing Him at the same moment."(4) Lewis responds by laying out his theology of God and time. God isn't "hurried along in the Time-stream of this universe," but lives in the 'eternal now', and, thus, "has all eternity in which to listen to" the prayers of people.(5)

The issue posed here displays a lack of knowledge about some of God's significant attributes. What's amazing about the God of Scripture is that he does attend to millions of people who are addressing all at the same time. God is omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, and omni-resoureful. He is present everywhere, with everyone. When you pray, he is right there with you; and he knows what you need, and he knows the best way to respond to all of your actions; and he is powerful enough to attend to your prayers. With all of this, he is omni-resourceful. God is so awe-inspiring that he can attend to all of the actions of free agents within time.

God Isn't What Man Thinks He Should Be

This eternal now concept was developed by philosophers attempting to come up with the characteristics of God through reason.(6) They thought, God is perfect, and what is perfect does not change, does not experience emotion, and is not subject to time. Surely the God that created time would not himself experience it! Or, as Lewis said, "Almost certainly, God is not in Time."
Ironically, this is a finite understanding of God. Finite reason led man to this conclusion, not Scripture. The problem with eternalism is not that the scope of finite minds is too limited to understand eternity, but that it was only limited finite minds that came up with it!

Lewis should not have said that a characteristic of God is 'almost certain' when he himself recognizes that it isn't even in Scripture. Many people assume many things about God simply because that's what they were taught, that's what their reason tells them, or that's the popular consensus. We should be getting our theology from Scripture; we should not read Scripture with preconceived theological assumptions.

What is amazing about the God of Scripture is that he relates to the world in time, he adapts to their actions and is affected by their actions. He is intimately involved in every second of human history. He is not the unattainable, immutable, impassible, unmoved mover. In other words, he is not what man thinks he should be.


Notes:
(1) C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1952), 133.
(2) Ibid.
(3) For a good biblical assessment of timelessness theology, see Michael R. Saia, Does God Know the Future? (Fairfax: Xulon Press, 2002).
(4) Lewis, 130.
(5) Ibid., 131.
(6) For more on the historical development of classical theism, see Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), and Edwin Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas on Christianity (New York: Harper & Row, 1957). For a general overview, see John Sanders, "Historical Considerations," in The Openness of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994); also, Clark H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), 65-74; Gregory A. Boyd, "Two Ancient (and Modern) Motivations for Ascribing Exhaustively Definite Foreknowledge to God," Religious Studies 46, no. 1 (2010), 41–59; and Saia, "A Brief History of Timelessness," 29–50.

To Infinity and Beyond: What C.S. Lewis Got Wrong, Part 1

C.S. Lewis is internationally known for being a Christian apologist, imaginative theologian, and powerful author of fiction. To the average Christian, he is brilliant. And indeed, most of his writing is quite powerful, well-thought-out, and genius. That being said, his theology of God's relationship with time is anything but brilliant. Here, I will first present some excerpts of his explanation of it from Mere Christianity, and then I will analyze and dismantle its biblical and philosophical integrity.

"Almost certainly God is not in Time. His life does not consist in moments following one another."(1) 

"[W]hat we call 'tomorrow' is visible to Him in just the same way as what we call 'today.' All the days are 'Now' for Him. He does not remember you doing things yesterday; He simply sees you doing them, because, though you have lost yesterday, He has not. He does not 'foresee' you doing things tomorrow; He simply sees you doing them: because, though tomorrow is not yet there for you, it is for Him."(2)

[W]ith Him it is, so to speak, still 1920 and already 1960.(3)

If you picture Time as a straight line along which we have to travel, then you must picture God as the whole page on which the line is drawn. We come to the parts of the line one by one: we have to leave A behind before we get to B, and cannot reach C until we leave B behind. God, from above or outside or all around, contains the whole line, and sees it all.(4)

For, of course, to have a history means losing part of your reality (because it had already slipped away into the past) and not yet having another part (because it is still in the future): in fact having nothing but the tiny little present, which has gone before you can speak about it. God forbid we should think God was like that. Even we may hope not to be always rational in that way.(5)

This view has been around for centuries, and is quite popular among many Christian theologians. However, when analyzed thoroughly, it falls apart. In Part 1, I am dealing with this theology philosophically. In Part 2 (here), I will deal with it biblically.

Before I break down his argument, I must comment on something Lewis says at the beginning of his chapter on God & time: he makes the point that theologians "first started the idea that some things are not in time at all: later the Philosophers took it over."(6) I don't know where he got this, because it is simply not true. The concept of divine timelessness was originated in early Hellenistic philosophy, not in Scripture or in Christian theology.(7) The philosopher that introduced the concept was Parmenides.(8)

Is the "eternal now" concept philosophically sound?

Though there are many problems philosophically with this view, I will deal only with the ones that stick out to me the most.(9)

1) The "eternal now" concept that Lewis here supports assumes many things. One of which is a faulty understanding of past, present, and future. Lewis believes that every second of human history (past, present, and future), or Time, is present to God, and God doesn't move along with time. But for this to be true, God can't have any relation to the world at all, because relating to the world consists of moving with time, and God apparently doesn't.

Lewis says God "does not 'foresee' you doing things tomorrow; He simply sees you doing them."(10) His use of sees implies time. If God is in tomorrow, seeing what I am doing, he is experiencing time. Every second cannot be present to God in the eternal now if God is seeing what we are doing, because that implies that in his seeing, he moves from one second to the next, or, to use Lewis' words, from A to B.

And, of course, when Lewis says God "sees" what we are doing tomorrow, he not only means that God watches it, but that he is involved with it. After all, Lewis is not a deist, but a Christian, so he believes that God is intimately involved with the world. So not only does God see what I am doing tomorrow and yesterday and today all in the eternal now, but he is involved with it in the eternal now. So then, his statement about tomorrow would also imply this: God does not simply 'foresee' himself relating with you tomorrow, he is simply relating with your tomorrow self now. But this cannot be, for that would mean God is experiencing time, for he is relating with you, which implies that he moves from one second to the next

The only way the eternal now concept could work is if God wasn't involved with the world at all but just staring at it like a finished painting or a reel of film: God sees every frame all at once, but is not involved in it in any way, shape, or form. As William Hasker states, "the eternalist must hold that there is no time at which God exists."(11) Isaak August Dorner explains,

the living participation of God in the world . . . depends in fact upon our positing that God knows continually what is now present and that he does not have to the present simply the relation which he also has to the past and the future, as if these were just as much present for him as the former, since that would lead to a very lifeless and inadequate relation.(12)

He also rightly states that the eternal now theology implies Deism. Indeed, this is logically the only way that it could work, for God could see what we are doing yesterday, today, and tomorrow all at once only if he isn't involved in what we are doing.

2) Lewis doesn't realize that the state of 'Now' involves time. 'Now' moves, it progresses. 'Now' does not describe a fixed, frozen state in which something just is; 'Now' is always changing. I am typing this sentence Now, but as I type Now is continuously moving from second to second. 'Now' is not a state in which Time stops or does not exist. Thus, to say that past, present, and future, every second of human history, is 'Now' to God doesn't remove him from the process of moment-by-moment succession.
Watch the video to the right for a humorous illustration.

"What happened to 'Then'?" 
"We passed 'Then'." 
"When?" 
"Just now. We're at 'Now', now." 
"Go back to 'Then'." 
"When?" 
"Now." 
"Now?"
"Now!" 
"I can't." 
"Why?" 
"We missed it." 
"When?" 
"Just now." 

3) Lewis assumes that Time is a finished product. That past, present, and future are all settled like a reel of film, a painting on the wall or, to use his analogy, a book. This is a concept that was dreamed up by ancient Greek philosophers.(13) However, we have no reason to believe it is true, biblically or philosophically. In fact, we have considerable reason to believe that it isn't true. I will deal with the reason for this with my next point.

4) Not only does the eternal now concept assume that Time is a finished product, but it implies that God is the author of Time. Lewis creates an analogy of an author and his book, saying that "God is not hurried along in the Time-stream of this universe any more than an author is hurried along in the imaginary time of his own novel."(14) Lewis doesn't realize that this makes God the author of all of human history. Thus, Time is a finished product, a novel, and God is the author who relates with every page--or, more correctly, with every letter--of the book all at once. The flaw here is that God is not the only author involved in writing the book. He gave free agents the ability to contribute to how the novel will turn out. Thus, Time is not a finished product, because everything that happens in it is dependent upon not only God but all other free agents. Past, present, and future are not settled because the future is up to free agents to create. This leads me to my next point:

5) Lewis assumes that the future exists. He says, "Everyone who believes in God at all believes that He knows what you and I are going to do tomorrow."(15) Of course this isn't true, but I guess Lewis just wasn't aware of any open theists. Nor should it be true, for tomorrow is dependent upon free agents to create. For God to see and be involved in tomorrow assumes that tomorrow exists when it doesn't.

Lewis also assumes that tomorrow is dependent solely upon God. Of course, this is true in the sense that all things are dependent upon God's sustaining power, but the actual reality and existence of tomorrow is dependent upon the actions of God and other free agents.

For these (but also many other) reasons, the eternal now concept that Lewis advocates is logically absurd and, therefore, not philosophically sound.

Notes:
(1) C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1952), 131.
(2) Ibid., 133.
(3) Ibid., 132.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid., 132-133.
(6) Ibid., 131.
(7) See Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), and Edwin Hatch, The Influence of Greek Ideas on Christianity (New York: Harper & Row, 1957). For a general overview, see John Sanders, "Historical Considerations," in The Openness of God (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994), as well as his The God Who Risks, rev. ed. (Downers Grove: IVP, 2007), 140-160; also, Clark H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001), 65-74; Gregory A. Boyd, "Two Ancient (and Modern) Motivations for Ascribing Exhaustively Definite Foreknowledge to God," Religious Studies 46, no. 1 (2010), 41–59; and, finally, Michael R. Saia, "A Brief History of Timelessness," in Does God Know the Future? (Fairfax: Xulon Press, 2002), 29–50.
(8) Sanders, "Historical Considerations," 62. For a thorough treatment of Parmenides, see G.S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1983), 239-262.
(9) For more philosophical objections to the eternal now concept, see William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 144-185.
(10) Lewis, 133. 
(11) Hasker, 162.
(12) Isaak August Dorner, Divine Immutability: A Critical Reconsideration, trans. Robert R. Williams and Claude Welch (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), 152.
(13) See note 7.
(14) Lewis, 131.
(15) Ibid., 133.

Matt Brake and John Daniel Holloway on Open Theism

What is your understanding of Open Theism?

Matt: In layman's terms, a good understanding of Open Theism: the future is not set in stone; God has not set the future in stone; God has delegated free will and choice to the physical universe and, in doing so, that gives free choice teeth; choice is not an illusion, as in double predestination. But, in that, God sees all the possibilities of the future.

John Daniel: David Basinger highlights key factors of Open Theology: a claim about God's power, God's moral nature, God's emotive nature, and God's knowledge. With regard to God's power, it states that at the beginning of time, he gave humanity power to create their futures--free will. With regard to God's moral nature, it says that he is love and perfectly revealed in Christ, who entered into solidarity with the world, experienced time with the world, and suffered to save the world. With regard to his emotive nature, Open Theism denies God's impassibility and says that humanity affects God intimately. He suffers with, for, and because of humanity. With regard to God's knowledge (and this is the most distinct feature), Open Theism denies that God possesses exhaustive foreknowledge of the future. The future does not yet exist, except as possibilities--all of which God knows perfectly.

Why do you think people are afraid of Open Theism?

Matt: Because they're afraid of a God who doesn't know the future. If God doesn't know the future, then he isn't in control--which undermines people's trust in God. They also fear because certain theological gatekeepers have made them afraid of it. People who say, "Open Theists don't worhsip the same God as the Christian God," etc. Even if the idea has its merits, they pressure people into thinking that they're committing idolatry if they give Open Theist ideas any consideration. They may lose their salvation.
(Which begs the question: what defines a true believer? one who believes all the right things, or who is all the right things? )

John Daniel: Open Theology gets vilified. The "guardians" of evangelical theology, when they hear something they think undermines God's glory, turn such a theology into something incredibly "liberal" and paint it as something which goes against all Scripture. Not only does it undermine the glory of God (as they see it) but in their minds it completely ignores Scriptural teaching. They don't accept that the view interprets Scripture a certain way; they consider Open Theists to be rejecting parts of Scripture in order to find a God who makes more sense to them.
People are afraid because they are fed this propaganda.

Matt: I remember talking to a pretty Calvinist dude before I heard of Open Theism. He said he didn't think Clark Pinnock was really a Christian because he was an Open Theist. That's inaccurate; with Open Theism you don't redefine who God is, you redefine what omniscience is.

John Daniel: Well...that's the most unique feature of Open Theology. There are others.

How is Open Theism compatible with the blatant predestination passages in Scripture?

John Daniel: It's a case by case basis. Most of the time there's nothing incongruent with the passages about God predestining events, and God's lack of exhaustive foreknowledge. God can know in the future whatever he decides is going to happen--when he decides that he is going to do something, he makes it happen. He knew that he was going to send Jesus; he could know that because it was his choice. Sometimes he does make executive decisions, but, again, it is a case by case basis depending on the particular Scriptures that mention predestination. Lots of times the text doesn't actually say when he predestined such things. None of those verses require us to think he presdestines all things, or that he has exhaustive foreknowledge of the future.

Matt: So what you're saying is, as opposed to the classical view of omniscence, God's omnipotence causes something to happen rather than the future being set in stone?

John Daniel: Yes. He can make executive decisions because of his omnipotence.

Matt: Not fatalistic? He was planning it, but he made it happen in the moment?

John Daniel: I think God can look into the future as it is--as possibilities--and see a need. He knew that Christ would be a necessity; so, before time began he predestined Christ's coming.

Does Open Theism lead to the rejection of biblical inerrancy?

Matt: Since I don't buy into the concept of inerrancy, this is kind of a non-starter for me. I believe in inspiration; but if we're talking about the Bible being completely historically and scientifically inerrant, then no I do not believe that. When it comes to Scripture, I think Open Thesim, instead of imposing fatalism on the text, allows the Bible to say what it's actually saying. And it allows you to take into account things like genre, historical setting, and what modern science has told us about the world and about time. It makes our understanding of Scripture potentially richer. 

John Daniel: I agree with Matt. But I will add that I absolutely do not think Open Theism requires a rejection of biblical inerrancy. I suppose it doesn't look good, however, that I also don't buy into the inerrantist view of scripture. But I, like Karl Barth, still treat the Bible as inerrant in its teaching. Though there may be historical things we can't explain, and it's not a book of science or inerrant in its details, and it does include human elements, I think the teachings of Scripture are absolutely inerrant. In that, you could be an inerrantist and an Open Theist because the two beliefs are unrelated. They're two different topics. You dont have to deny inerrancy to say that God faces an open future.

Matt: Michael Saia might confirm. He holds a very conservative view of Scripture, and yet, is in Open Theist.

John Daniel: I'm an Open Theist because of Scripture. When God says "perhaps" and "if," I take it seriously, and I include it in my assesment of God's nature. Thus, there is no denial of biblical inerrancy inherent in Open Theism.

Question from Debbie: My interaction with strict inerrantists has shown me that they read the Psalms with just as much authority as the prophets or the words of Jesus or of Paul. And all throughout the Psalms is language of God's foreknowledge, and basically just language that says a lot about foreknowing and predestining and, so, it kind of refutes Open Theology in general. So, that kind of inerrantist probably would have a problem with Open Theology. Your thoughts?

John Daniel: I don't agree that the Psalms support exhaustive foreknowledge and predestination as you say. Some seem to support it, but they don't require it. When the psalmist says "you know my actions before I do them," the point is not to theologize about God knowing the future. The point is to say how well God knows him. I still think God knows the person so well that he knows what he is most likely to do, and he is not at all surprised at what he does. And I think you can be an inerrantist and look at the Bible in a more realistic way.

Open Theists tend to focus on the love of God, as claimed by both critics and advocates. Is there a place for God's wrath, holiness, and judgment in Open Theism?

John Daniel: Well, obviously there has to be because wrath, holiness, and judgment are in Scripture. So, if we are to have a complete theology from Scripture, we have to include such elements. However, I do not think we have to adopt the popular views of God's wrath, holiness, and judgment. Open Theism is a very Christ-centered theology: God experiences time with us, is affected by us, suffers with us and for us, does not control us, and in love gives us freedom. Open Theology takes seriously the statement that God is love. Thus, we look at God's wrath, holiness, and judgment through the lens of Christ and his love. This does not mean that God's wrath is somehow transformed into lollipops. But, rather than holding up an angry, wrathful image of God and combining that with a love-filled, Christ-like image of God, and by doing so creating a paradox, Open Theology looks at God's wrath, holiness, and judgment in a way that is compatible with his Christ-like nature.

Matt: I don't think Open Theism does away with God's wrath. It does do away with the Calvinist notion of double predestination (i.e. that God predestines some people to Heaven and others to Hell regardless of their will). It takes choice seriously, and it isn't any different from Wesley's prevenient grace, anyway. So I don't know what the fuss is about!

John Daniel: It also does away with the Calvinist understanding of God's wrath. In Open Theology, wrath is not something that brings God glory, but rather is something that breaks his heart.

Does Open Theism make God smaller and less powerful?

Matt: I guess that depends on which Open Theist you listen to. I like Boyd's idea that God sees all of the infinite possibilities--which...put your head around that: ALL of the infinite possibilities--as a opposed to one set plan. However, If your idea of a big God is that of a God who needs to know everything in advance, and you want to continue dealing with the "paradox" of a God who knows the future, possibly causes the future, and yet still gives man free will, and then you want to say, "Well, we'll just never understand God, I guess"--well, then, two things: 1) I smell "cop-out" and 2) good luck...you're probably still going to Heaven.

John Daniel: Quite the contrary. I think a smaller, less powerful God would need to know the future. A smaller, less powerful God would need to control everything and everyone in order to get what he wants. A more awe-inspiring God is one who faces an open future full of possibilities, and through wisdom has to decide the perfect responses--and still get what he wants! First, like Matt said, think about what it would mean to know the trillions of possibilities because of your exhaustive knowledge of the past, present, and all of earth's inhabitants. Then, think about how wise God would have to be to execute the perfect responses to billions of free wills who constantly oppose his will. Then, think about the fact that in the midst of all of this, God still remains "in control" in the sense that we don't give him anything he can't handle, and we don't give him anything he can't use for good. Then, think about the fact that, in the end, God will get what he wants, even after thousands upon thousands of years of opposition to his will--all because he is so wise. I think Open Theology--maybe, ironically--presents a much more awe-inspiring view of God's wisdom than that of the Arminian and Calvinist views.

What do you think?
Feel free to join the conversation in the comment section below.

Why I Am an Open Theist

In case you haven't gotten this in my past blogs, I am an open theist. This entails many things, but the one that is distinct from other Christian views is the belief that, to God, the future is made up of possibilities and not exact certainties. Thus, God does not possess exhaustive foreknowledge (Click here if you want more information). I came to this conclusion about a year and a half ago. Here, I will not discuss all the ins and outs of how I view God's foreknowledge, but I would simply like to share why I came to this conclusion.

Because the Bible Tells Me So

I originally decided on open theism while taking a class on the Prophets. I was writing about the suffering of God in Jeremiah and I picked up Terence Fretheim's book The Suffering of God. In my reading of Jeremiah, I was struck by 26:3: "Perhaps they will listen and everyone will turn from his evil way, that I may repent of the calamity which I am planning to do to them because of the evil of their deeds." I realized that there are many verses just like this, where God says "If" or "Perhaps" in such a way that it suggests that he does not exactly know what the outcome will be. I saw that Fretheim had a chapter on the subject of God's uses of these words, and so I read it. I didn't know then that Fretheim is an open theist (nor did I know what open theism was), but when I read his chapter, I highlighted so much of it because it made so much sense to me.

It is important to note that the deciding factor for me had nothing to do with whether or not God's foreknowledge limits human freedom (which is what it was for most open theists). That idea hadn't even crept into my mind at that point. My decision was solely based on the passages of Scripture in which God doesn't seem to know exactly what is going to happen.

That being said, once I accepted the view, several other elements came into the picture.

The Traditional View Limits God's Freedom

The more I thought about the idea of God's exhaustive foreknowledge, the less I agreed with it. I read Clark Pinnock's chapter about open theism in Predestination & Free Will: Four Views. In it, he supports the idea that if God has exhaustive foreknowledge of the future, then humans do not have free will. At that point, I didn't agree or disagree with that position. I was never bothered by the idea of God's foreknowledge and my free will.

The idea that did bother me was that if God has foreknowledge, then it limits his freedom. Think about it. If God knows exactly how things are going to turn out, then he knows exactly how he is going to interact with the world for the rest of time. Furthermore, since he cannot be wrong in his knowledge of the future, he has to interact with the world in the future the way that he sees it. He can do nothing else but what he sees himself doing in the future. Thus, God's freedom is limited.

God: Past, Present, and Future?

Many would disagree with the last section because they look at the God-time relationship in a completely different manner. Past, present, and future, in their minds, are all present to God in the "eternal now." What we call past, God is experiencing as present; what we call future, God is experiencing as present. Time is a book, or a movie, with a beginning, middle and end. Since God is outside of time, and since he is omnipotent, they believe he is in every page, every moment, all at once. This view assumes that time is already completed--that the future has already been resolved and we are just living out a part of the completed product of time.

I do not view time this way. I view time more like an unfinished painting. God started the painting at the beginning of time, and equipped us with a brush and paint with which we can paint our futures. Yet, we live inside the painting (thus, not the best analogy. But what analogy could properly describe God's relationship with time?). God doesn't live inside the painting, he is beyond it. He transcends it, and yet is immanent in it. Unlike us, he is not bound by the canvas or the frame. That being said, the painting is unfinished, so there is still a past, present, and future of the painting--even to God, precisely because he created it that way.

The idea that the past, present, and future are all present to God is, to me, completely nonsensical. We definitely do not get this concept from Scripture. In Scripture, we see God in time living with his people, experiencing a past and a present and looking at a future. This doesn't mean that God is not also outside of time, but being outside of time doesn't have to me mean what many think it does. Supposing that God is in past, present, and future all at once puts a distance between him and his time-bound people. As 19th century theologian Isaak Dorner states, "the living participation of God in the world, his living communion of love with it, depends in fact upon our positing that God knows continually what is now present and that he does not have to the present simply the relation which he also has to the past and the future, as if these were just as much present for him as the former, since that would lead to a very lifeless and inadequate relation."

Does God's Foreknowledge Limit Human Freedom?

Like I said before, when I first agreed with open theism, it had nothing to do with the idea that God's foreknowledge means we can't have free will. That being said, I have now come to that conclusion.

That I have free will means that, though I chose to write this blog, given the same circumstances 30 minutes ago, I could choose not to write the blog but could go do something else. To have free will means I can choose to do whatever I want, that I am not bound to one choice.

Let us say that God knows that on January 21st, 2048, Robert Smith will go see a movie. Because God's knowledge must be true, that has to happen. When the day comes and Robert is given the choice to either go see a movie or stay home, Robert has to go see a movie. He can do nothing else. His free will is limited to that one option. Thus, though subjectively it may seem that we have free will, we objectively do not have free will because our future choices are bound to God's definite knowledge of them.

This could have (and maybe should have) been longer. I haven't included all the elements of open theism, nor I have explained in detail what my view of God's foreknowledge is, but, like I said at the top, I just wanted to share with you why I came to this conclusion.

If you would like to discuss this topic with me more, we can definitely do that.

What we can learn from A. N. Whitehead about the nature of God

This is the third post that I've written about what we can learn from a liberal theologian (except Karl Barth wasn't actually liberal). I believe it is important for us to read these theologians and learn from them what we can. They will challenge us on a lot of our assumptions and can transform our thinking on several issues as well.

Alfred North Whitehead was a scientist, mathematician, philosopher, and theologian, and followed a natural religion dictated by his own philosophy.(1) Here, I will use Whitehead to challenge Christian thinking on God's impassibility, immutability, and all-controlling sovereignty over human wills.

Rather than believing in an omnipotent, timeless God, Whitehead believed that the world contained God: "the world creates God and God creates the world."(2) He did believe that God was superior to the world, but also that God evolves with the world and becomes more and more superior over time.(3)

Furthermore, Whitehead believed that there are two aspects of God: the primordial and the consequent. The primordial aspect of God represents everything in his character that remains constant, the part of God that does not change. The consequent aspect of God is God's actual experience, which constantly changes and adapts to the world, because Whitehead believed that the world affects God. He also believed that God affects the world, that he is constantly trying to influence and persuade the world with his ideals so that he may accomplish them and "enhance harmony, beauty, and enjoyment."(4)

In this God-world relationship, Whitehead believed that God does not accomplish his ideals through coercion, meaning he does not force his plans into action. He did not believe that God possesses a dominating control over everyone and everything. He believed that everyone has "free will and self-determination and may comply with God's ideal or resist it."(5) Whitehead did believe in evil as well; he held that evil is what happens when humanity resists and rejects God's ideals, and he believed this causes God to suffer, because "God is enriched and impoverished by the world's responses to his persuasive influence."(6)

In order to assess what we can learn from A.N. Whitehead, I will examine his theology of God in regards to popular Christian understandings of God as impassible, immutable, and completely sovereign over all human action.

On these subjects, Gregory Boyd has observed that, "In Western philosophical tradition, emotional vulnerability is a weakness, so we have projected onto God the attribute of 'impassibility' (above suffering). All variability is thought to be an imperfection, so God must be 'immutable' (above any sort of change). Lack of control is also an imperfection, so God meticulously controls everything."(7) These flawed philosophical assumptions are the focus of this blog.

Does God Suffer?

Jürgen Moltmann has stated that, "The one who is capable of love is also capable of suffering, for he also opens himself up to the suffering which is involved in love, and yet remains superior to it by virtue of his love."(8)
 
Anyone who reads the prophets can see that God does indeed suffer. Terence Fretheim has noted that, in the prophets, the "grief of God is as current as the people's sin."(9) Indeed, "God is revealed not as one who remains coolly unaffected by the rejection of the people, but as one who is deeply wounded by the broken relationship."(10) Harold Knight goes as far as to say that God is "the greatest sufferer of all, because He alone . . . experiences the ultimate significance of every turn and phase of [the drama of human history] in the most intimate personal way."(11) This is due to the fact that "God relates at every level with the whole person of each individual."(12) Abraham Joshua Heschel observed in the prophets that God "is personally involved in, even stirred by, the conduct and fate of man. . . . man is a perpetual concern of God . . . a factor in the life of God."(13) 

However, God's grief does not mean that he is in any way pathetic or powerless. Fretheim has added that, "while indicating that God is indeed a vulnerable God, touched and affected in the deepest possible way by what the people have done to the relationship, God's grief does not entail being emotionally overwhelmed or embittered by the barrage of rejection."(14)
 
God's suffering is in his passion. Walter Brueggeman has described this divine passion as "a propensity to suffer with and suffer for, to be in solidarity with Israel in its suffering, and by such solidarity to sustain a relationship that rightfully could be terminated."(15) God's passion is passion to the fullest extent possible: "Is Ephraim My dear son? . . . My heart (mē’eh) yearns (hāmâ) for him" (Jer. 31:20). The Hebrew words here indicate that the deepest part of God has been disturbed by a tremendous, tempestuous heartache brought about by his incomprehensible love, strong compassion, unending care and concern, and boundless empathy. This is the passion and, consequently, the suffering of God. In Jeremiah, God's sorrow over his people's rejection "is beyond healing" (8:18); he is broken for the brokenness of his people (v.21); "dismay has taken hold of [him]" (v.21), to the point where his eyes are a fountain of tears, weeping day and night (9:1).

Thus, Whitehead's understanding of God as one who is affected by the world and suffers when it rejects him is very biblical.

Does God Change?

"I, the LORD, do not change," says Malachi 3:6. And there is also James 1:17, which tells us that "there is no variation or shifting shadow" in the Father of Lights. But there are a multitude of instances in which God changed his mind (Gen. 6:6-7; Ex. 32:14; 1 Sam. 15:11, 35; 2 Sam. 24:16; 1 Kings 21:21-22, 28-29; 1 Chron. 21:15; 2 Chron. 12:5-8; Ps. 106:45; Jer. 7:5-7; 15:6; 18:8-10; 26:3,13,19; 42:10; Ezek. 20:5-22; Hos. 11:5-9; Amos 7:3,6; Jonah 3:9-10; 4:2; Joel 2:13). So his mind can change; But does anything else about him change?

What about the incarnation? The Word became flesh (John 1:14). Jesus Christ, whose nature was that of God, emptied himself and became a servant whose nature was that of humanity (Phil 2:6-8). Christ became sin (2 Cor. 5:21); he became a curse for us (Gal. 3:13). If that doesn't tell someone God can change, I don't know what will.(16) 

So what do Malachi 3:6 and James 1:17 mean when they say that God does not change? I contend that Whitehead's understanding of the two aspects of God answers that very question. There is the aspect of God that is immutable (or, in Whitehead's terms, the primordial aspect of God). For example, God is love (1 Jn. 4:8). He is and always has been and always will be love. As Boyd says, "The cross reveals the immutability of God’s love."(16) There are many other parts of his nature as well that have never changed and will never change.

However, there is also the aspect of God that adapts to the world (the consequent aspect). We can see throughout the Old and New Testaments that God adapts to the cultures of his people. Though it is safe to say that God does not approve of slavery, he put up with it in order to communicate himself to the cultures that engaged in it. Though it is safe to say that God's ideal for marriage is monogamy, he put up with men who had several wives and concubines. H. Wheeler Robinson observes that in the divine purpose, "we see the unchanging will of God, and in that sense He is the unchanging One." However, he adds that changes "are involved in the working-out of that purpose."(18) It is not that his ideals change or that his nature changes, but he does adapt to humanity in order to communicate himself to us.(19) Is this not what he did in Christ?

Thus, Whitehead's understanding of the primordial and the consequent aspects of God is also quite biblical.

Does God Control Everything?

In 2 Samuel 24, it is written that God's anger drove him to incite David to take a census of Israel and Judah (v.1). In verse 10, David is grief-stricken and convicted because taking the census was apparently a sin, so he begged the Lord to take away his guilt for being so foolish. In 1 Chronicles 21, the same story is recorded. Except, in verse 1, it says that Satan incited David to take the census! And in verse 8 David begs God to take away his guilt for listening to Satan.

I think what we see here is a change of theology. According to Heschel, "Evil was accepted because it came from God. Then people began to wonder whether it was right to hold God responsible for all misfortunes that happen to man."(20) They realized that the evil in the world could not be contributed to God, but that there was a free agent of chaos trying to kill, steal and destroy God's creation. They realized that God does not control everything, because there is evil in this world, of which God in all his goodness is not the source.

We can see throughout Scripture that God clearly does not control everything. One proof of this can be seen in the fact that God experiences opposition with his people. He suffers and is angered by their rejection of him. He often asks his people 'Why?'.

"All day long I have held out my hands to an obstinate people" (Isa. 65:2; Rom. 10:21)

"Turn! Turn from your evil ways! Why will you die, O house of Israel?" (Ez. 33:11)

"Rid yourselves of all the offenses you have committed, and get a new heart and a new spirit. Why will you die, O house of Israel?" (Ez. 18:31)

"Why then has this people turned away in perpetual backsliding? They hold fast to deceit; they refuse to return." (Jer. 8:5)

"Why have they provoked me to anger with their images, with their worthless foreign idols?" (Jer. 8:19)

If God is controlling everything and everyone, why does he face opposition? Why does he cause people to reject him, only to experience suffering and anger? Why would he ask 'Why?'? If he was in control of everyone's actions, he could make them do whatever he wanted them to do. He would never face opposition or rejection. Furthermore, if God controlled everyone and everything, why would he ask, "Why?"? It simply would not make sense, for he would be asking himself the question. He would not need to ask why if he was the one behind people's actions.

In the New Testament as well, we see people rejecting God and resisting the Holy Spirit.

"Pharisees and experts in the law rejected God's purpose for themselves" (Lk. 7:30)

"You stiff-necked people, with uncircumcised hearts and ears! You are just like your fathers: You always resist the Holy Spirit!" (Acts 7:51)

And then there are the words of Jesus himself, who said:

Jerusalem . . . how often I have longed to gather your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were not willing. (Matt. 23:37)

If God controlled everyone and everything, there would not be anyone rejecting his purpose for them or resisting his Holy Spirit. If God controlled everything, why on earth would Jesus say "you were not willing," as if the person was not controlled by his Father? If God controlled everything, to say such things would be absolutely absurd!

Thus, it is entirely biblical to believe like Whitehead that God does not coerce anyone because everyone has free will and self-determination; he can only be as persuasive as he possibly can.
Whitehead is also accurate in his depiction of God always trying to influence the world with his ideals. This is basically the mission of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. They are forever trying to draw all of humanity to their wonderful embrace. They seek to reconcile the world to themselves so that they can restore all people to the images of God that they were intended to be. They are fighting to restore peace and "enhance harmony, beauty, and enjoyment."

So you can see that there is plenty we can learn from Whitehead's theology of God. Though he did offer some ideas that are not compatible with Scripture (for such was not his concern), he emphasized a lot of ideas that, though are unusual in many Christian circles, are entirely biblical. We have seen yet again that an unorthodox theologian can challenge ideas we have that may not be biblical (and in this case, are not) and can even cause our theology to evolve into a more Scriptural, more reasonable philosophy.

Notes:
(1) See Roger E. Olson, The Story of Christian Theology: Twenty Centuries of Tradition & Reform (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1999), 600-601.
(2) Ibid., 600.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ibid.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Ibid., 601.
(7) Gregory A. Boyd, Is God to Blame? Beyond Pat Answers to the Problem of Suffering (Grand Rapids: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 36. For a further study on this, see Jürgen Moltmann, "The apatheia of God and the freedom of man," in The Crucified God, trans. R. A. Wilson and John Bowden (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 267-270.

(8) Moltmann, 230. Also, see H. Wheeler Robinson, Suffering, Human and Divine (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1940), 176: "Let us wheel and attack the doctrine of divine impassibility by asking what meaning there can be in a love which is not costly to the lover?"

(9) Terence Fretheim, The Suffering of God (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 111. This is a fabulous work on the subject of God's suffering and passion.
(10) Ibid., 123. 
(11) Harold Knight, The Hebrew Prophetic Consciousness (London: Lutterworth Press, 1947), 138.
(12) Fretheim, 123.
(13) Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Prophets (New York: Perennial Classics, 2001), 289, 292. This is another absolutely essential work on God's passion and suffering. Heschel refers to it as God's pathos.
(14) Fretheim, 111. 
(15) Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy (Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 1997), 299. 
(16) I owe these insights to Greg Boyd. See Is God to Blame?, 36.
(17) Gregory A. Boyd, Repenting of Religion: Turning from Judgment to the Love of God (Baker Books, 2004), 168.
(18) Robinson, 173. For a fantastic challenge of the Christian understanding of God's immutability and impassibility, see his chapter "The Suffering of God," 158-182.
(19) I would also add that God's omniscience is also adapting with the world. As Nelson Pike states, "God is immutable with respect to His omniscience, but the specific content of God's knowledge might change. It might change as the objects and circumstances that are the objects of His knowledge change." Quoted in Linwood Urban, A Short History of Christian Thought. Rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 188-189.
(20) Heschel, 376.