Book Review: The Uncontrolling Love of God by Thomas Jay Oord

Oord, Thomas Jay. The Uncontrolling Love of God: An Open and Relational Account of Providence. Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2015. ★★★★☆

Thomas Jay Oord is, for me, one of the most compelling open/relational theologians writing today. His particular construction of open theology resolves some of the serious problems that arise in the work of other open theologians. He accomplished this in his 2010 book The Nature of Love: A Theology, by seeking to lay out a coherent theology that revolves around love. In his new book The Uncontrolling Love of God, he uses his theology of love to address the issue of providence, particularly as it pertains to the problem of evil.

He begins in chapter one by claiming that "tragedy needs explanation." If we have any theology, it needs to reckon with the evil and suffering we experience in concrete reality. He names this concrete reality by telling several stories that involve atrocities no good theologian could bear to overlook in addressing the question of evil and providence. Wherever our analysis goes in the forthcoming pages, he says, we must refer back to these stories as the standard for whether or not our theology is compelling.

In the second chapter, he discusses the inherent randomness of life, referring to experience and to science. His discussion of randomness based on science is more compelling than that of experience, (I will return to his treatment of experience in my overview of chapter three) but his overall point is a good one—to demonstrate that, empirically, we don't consider the universe as determined. Scientists recognize elements of unpredictability in the established order, and we in our experience assume such unpredictability.

But randomness, he says, is only one side of the coin. The other consists of life's "regularities"—such as, laws of nature, and morality. These regularities show that the universe is not altogether unpredictable, but is rather partly open and partly determined.

In chapter three, Oord deals with the topic of free agency. He applies his partly-open-partly-determined view of the universe to the human's free will. Humans are not absolutely free, he says, because we, by nature, have limited options:

We all know that we cannot do just anything we might imagine. For instance, we cannot fly to Mars this afternoon. We cannot change from being humans and become toads. We cannot all be president at once. We cannot freely put the entire moon in our basements. There are many things we cannot do, so skeptics say we must not be free at all. They seem to define free will as choosing among unlimited options and having no constraints. (58)

My criticism of this passage is that Oord does not provide an example of a "skeptic" who, seeing that a human can't become a toad, claims humans have no freedom at all. This seems like an exaggeration of the skeptic's case against free will. The passage also seems like a very conservative analysis of the human's limited options. What of the limitations placed on us because of our cultural conditioning, i.e. our presuppositions, established categories, inherent cognitive framework, etc.? Oord's silence regarding human situaded-ness makes me wonder if he thinks a human can assess options in an unmediated manner.

This leads to my next criticism of Oord's chapter on freedom--his argument from 'experience':

The most powerful evidence for free will is our own personal experience. In the way we act, we all inevitably presuppose we are, at least to some degree, free. I call this an experiential nonnegotiable. (60) 

Free will is an experiential nonnegotiable, and our personal experiences tell us something true about the nature of reality. (61)

I sympathize with this approach, while, however, not being uncritical of it. I sympathize with it because, at the end of the day, we are dependent on our experience to receive any information about the material world—so much so that it is even possible the "material world" is an illusion! I am critical of it, however, because it neglects the possibility that we could be misled by our experience, that the Truth could be much different than what our experience leads us to believe.

Why does Oord think we can trust our experience regarding questions of ultimate significance? Is our experience not mediated by cultural conditioning, evolutionary conditioning, and finite scope? If I were to, for example, deem my shirt blue, I would, in Oord's mind, be justified because my experience tells me my shirt is blue. However, we know that the colors we see aren't descriptive of the objects our minds attach to them, independently of our perception. A humorous example of this, with a blue and black dress, recently went viral. The dress was blue and black, but that didn't stop thousands from seeing it as white and gold.

If Oord's argument for free agency is personal experience, I think it is in trouble, because I don't think personal experience can be used as valid evidence of ultimate truth.

Oord also discusses "the problem of good" in chapter three. He says that, while theists have to reckon with evil, atheists have to reckon with good. "The problem of good is a real problem for unbelievers," he says (68). His only justification for this claim, however, is the assumption that phenomena must have explanations. If something is good, you have to explain why it is possible for good to exist in the world. But why do you have to explain it? He says "to make sense of life" (69), but he assumes that life is ours to make sense of, and I do not think this is a valid assumption. Already, in whatever ancient year it was, the book of Job claimed that the proper posture toward the chaotic abyss of the universe was humility and uncertainty. I think this might be a better framework than Oord's necessity of making sense of life.

In chapter four, Oord provides a helpful overview of different theologies of divine providence, complete with the problems he sees in various ones. They are too numerous to repeat here, but suffice it to say, Oord's overview is widely encompassing and well-balanced.

Chapter five includes Oord's overview of open and relational theology. He avoids merely repeating what has been published several times by including authors which have not normally seen the light of scholarship, such as Lorenzo D. McCabe, T. W. Brents, Jules Lequyer, Uriah Smith, and Edgar S. Brightman. Open theologians have much to uncover in the history of open and relational theology, and a lot of uncovered material to analyse, and it is commendable for Oord to begin to do so here.

Also included in chapter five is a fair comparison of process theology and open theology, as well as a helpful overview of the ways in which science has been in dialogue with open theology.

Perhaps the best chapter is the following one, which deals with John Sanders' theology of providence. In The Nature of Love, Oord looked at Clark Pinnock's theology, laying out in what ways it is strong and similar to his own, and explaining what he thinks its inadequacies are. He does the same with Sanders, and his criticism of Sanders ends up being quite similar to his criticism of Pinnock. That is, they both claim that God's is omnipotent and could always intervene to stop evil but often allows it to happen so that humans can be free. Oord, in both accounts, does a very good job of revealing how problematic these claims are. "The one who could stop genuine evil by restraining the perpetrator of evil," he says, "is morally responsible—or better, culpable—for permitting the painful consequences" (142-143)—and I could not agree more. He compellingly demonstrates that, in Sanders' theology, love does not come first.

For those who are familiar with Oord's work, there are no real surprises in the seventh chapter, for in it Oord offers his alternative to the models of God's providence he analyzed throughout the book—his "essential kenosis" theology, which claims that God is necessarily limited in power because it is in God's loving nature as a creator to share power with creatures. While as an a/theologian I find it ultimately unsatisfying (for reasons too complicated to go into here), Oord's "essential kenosis" theology remains, for me, the most compelling construction of open theology to date.

Oord's final chapter deals with the question of miracles. Orthodox Christians—including open theists, such as Sanders—often object to Oord's theology by pointing to miracles, which seem to them to be examples of God's unilateral activity. He has responded to this objection before, but here he dives into it in a more extensive manner. While an interesting assessment of the topic, I don't think Oord's response to the problem of miracles will sway his critics. I think he would do better to dialogue with historical-critical biblical scholarship on the subject, but part of Oord's project seems to be trying to keep an orthodox theology in tact while following his theological convictions. It is a noble task, even if a troublesome one.

Calvinism in Acts of the Apostles

I continue my blog series taking a look at passages in the Bible typically used to support Calvinism. So far, I have covered Romans 9 (here) and Ephesians 1 (here). Now, I'm going to deal with a few verses in the book of Acts that seem to support the theology: those are 2:23; 4:28; 13:48; 16:14; and 18:10. I contend that the most valid reading of these verses does not support Calvinist interpretations at all.

Acts 2:23 and 4:28 can be responded to together because they both refer to the same idea. 2:23 says that Jesus was “handed over to [Jews] according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God” and was “crucified and killed by the hands of those outside the law.” Similarly, 4:28 says that Herod and Pontius Pilate gathered together “to do whatever [God’s] hand and [his] plan had predestined to take place.” Both verses allude to the idea that the crucifixion was God’s definite, predestined plan.

Ajith Fernando claims that we see here “the paradox between divine providence and human responsibility.”(1) This response is typical of Calvinists. However, it is not a paradox at all, but can be reasonably explained. Gregory Boyd observes that “Both texts speak of the event of the crucifixion being preordained and foreknown. But neither speak of Herod or Pilate being preordained or foreknown to carry out this event.”(2) Of course the crucifixion was the definite plan predestined by God!(3) But, as Boyd says, these verses do not say that the actions of the Jews, those outside the law, Herod, and Pilate were included in the predestined plan of God.

John Sanders states that hōrismenē boulē (definite plan) in 2:23 denotes “a boundary-setting will.”(4) Here, the crucifixion is the “boundary,” meaning God decided beforehand that Christ would be crucified, and established, based on his precise foreknowledge, the perfect time for this to occur.

Furthermore, it cannot be said from these verses that people cannot resist God’s will. Luke himself is aware of the fact that people can and always have resisted God’s will. Luke 7:30 says that “by refusing to be baptized by [John the Baptist], the Pharisees and the lawyers rejected God’s purpose for themselves” (emphasis mine). In Acts 7:51, before Stephen was martyred, he exclaims, “You men who are stiff-necked and uncircumcised in heart and ears are always resisting the Holy Spirit; you are doing just as your fathers did” (emphasis mine).

The other verse in Acts Calvinists use to support their theology is 13:48: when Paul and Barnabas announced to a large crowd of people that the salvation offering had come to the Gentiles, the Gentiles rejoiced and “as many as were appointed to eternal life believed.”(5)

C. K. Barrett says that this verse remains “as unqualified a statement of absolute predestination as is found anywhere in the NT.”(6) Indeed, the verse seems to be that, not only because of its wording, but also because it is reminiscent of the idea that names are written into the book of life.(7) But the verse only seems to point to a Calvinist theology of individual predestination when taken at face value. Paton Gloag voices that here, “Luke merely mentions a historical fact—that those who believed were appointed to eternal life.”(8) This translation is more likely. The word ἐπίστευσαν (believed) precedes the rest of the statement ὅσοι ἦσαν τεταγμένοι εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον (all who were appointed to eternal life). Thus, the text could very easily be read, “all who believed were appointed to eternal life.”

In this case, there is no problem at all; the wording no longer suggests that the appointing came before the believing, and the similarity to the references of the book of life is more natural, for none of those references state that specific names were written in the book of life before the foundations of the earth—only that the names of those who believe are included.

This translation fits better within the context as well. Verse 46 says that the Jews rejected the word of God and did not consider themselves worthy of eternal life (meaning they were not appointed to eternal life because they rejected the Gospel). So then, Paul and Barnabas turned to the Gentiles, and all who believed were found worthy of eternal life.

All of that being said, this interpretation has not been used by most Bible translations. As Esther Yue Ng suggests, ἦσαν τεταγμένοι (were appointed) in this passage “implies an action that precedes the Gentiles’ believing” and contends that the verse is “one among a number of biblical passages that comports better with the Calvinist/Reformed understanding of divine election.”(9) Though I disagree, even if one does not accept Gloag’s interpretation, the Calvinist theological conclusion of the verse is still not the conclusion that should be drawn. Boyd observes that “the verse does not tell us when these people were destined. . . . Calvinists assume that this destiny was given to the elect before the world began by sheer divine fiat, but the text simply does not say this.”(10) Rather, Boyd continues, the text

only requires us to accept that the Spirit of God had been preparing receptive hearts to accept the preaching that was soon coming their way. . . . Those Gentiles who didn’t resist the Spirit’s work in their lives were ‘ripe’ for the message of Paul and Barnabas. In this sense, they were already ‘destined for eternal life,’ and thus they accepted the good news when it was preached to them.(11)

Boyd’s conclusion is quite plausible; definitely more-so than the Calvinist interpretation. This is true also of Acts 18:10 and 16:14. When God says “I have many people in this city” (18:10), he could be referring to those who were “ripe for the message,” as Boyd says. Lydia in 16:14 is an example of such a person. The verse says that God opened her heart to Paul’s message. However, this was not without her will. Lydia is introduced in the verse as “a worshiper of God.” Thus, she had already subjected herself to God’s work. By worshiping God, she yielded to him and, in a sense, let him open her heart to Paul’s teaching.“Whatever be the precise nuance of the words,” says I. Howard Marshall, “there is no suggestion that [the Gentiles] received eternal life independently of their own act of conscious faith.”(12)

We have seen that, when examined closely, all the verses in Acts that seem to support Calvinism actually provide no platform on which Calvinists can base their theology. Any notion of individual predestination must be read into the texts because the verses themselves do not imply the conclusions that Calvinists make of them. Thus, as far as the book of Acts goes, Christians today do not have to fear that they are ignoring “Calvinist verses” and can maintain a love-centered understanding of the character of God.

Notes:
(1) Ajith Fernando, The NIV Application Commentary: Acts (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998), 102.
(2) Gregory A. Boyd, “How do you respond to Acts 2:23 and 4:28?” Reknew.org, http://reknew.org/2008/01/how-do-you-respond-to-acts-223-and-428/
(3) It is not applicable to this study, but Acts 2:23 has also been used to refute open theism because of its reference to God’s foreknowledge. In addressing this, we must ask “What is foreknowledge?” Is it knowing exactly every single thing that is ever going to happen? Or could it be knowing all of the possibilities that the future holds? We should ask what Luke’s purpose was in writing these verses in the first place. Was to establish the reality of a theological paradox of God controlling people’s actions yet holding them responsible for them? Robert W. Wall states otherwise, saying that the verses do not “envisage a predestinarian notion of divine providence but Luke’s logical deduction from his idea of Scripture. That is, if the Jesus event and the Spirit’s outpouring both follow the biblical script of God’s salvation, then God must have known about both in advance of their occurrence.” See Robert W. Wall, “The Acts of the Apostles,” in Vol. 10 of The New Interpreter’s Bible, ed. Leander E. Keck (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 2002), 66. Indeed, on similar lines, Richard I. Pervo notes that “Because Luke is more a ‘romantic’ than an ‘ironic’ theologian, he concentrates more on the fact and fulfillment of God’s plan than on what it reveals about the human situation.” See Richard I. Pervo, Acts: A Commentary, ed. Harold W. Attridge (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2009), 123, n.30.
(4) John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Providence, rev. ed. (Downers Grover: InterVarsity Press, 2007), 167.
(5) There has been a debate as to how the word τεταγμένοι should be translated. I have found that the choices include: “set,” “determined,” “appointed,” “destined,” “enrolled,” and a few others. Whichever you prefer will not affect the following study.
(6) C. K. Barrett, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, Vol. 1 (London: T. & T. Clark, 1994), 658.
(7) F. F. Bruce, The Book of the Acts, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1988), 267, n.111.
(8) Paton J. Gloag, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles, Vol. 2 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1870), 40.
(9) Esther Yue L. Ng, “ἦσαν τεταγμένοι in Acts 13:48: Middle Voice or Passive Voice? Implications for the Doctrine of Divine Election,” CGST Journal, 50 (2011): 192, 186. 
(10) Boyd, “How do you respond to Acts 13:48?”
(11) Gregory A. Boyd, Is God to Blame? (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 190–191. Elsewhere, Boyd elaborates on this concept, saying, “The Father is always looking for people whose hearts may be pliable in his hand (viz. through the Spirit) so he may ‘destine them to eternal life’ by opening up their heart to receive the Gospel.” See Boyd, “How do you respond to Acts 13:48?”
(12) I. Howard Marshall, Acts, Vol. 5 of Tyndale New Testament Commentaries, ed. Leon Morris (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1980), 245.

The Historical Romans 9, or Why everything you thought you knew is wrong

I was planning on writing a book against Calvinism from a biblical-theological perspective. The theological books against Calvinism out there don't engage scholarly Scriptural study in the way that they could, and the scholarly Scriptural evidence against Calvinism has not been gathered together and put into a layman's book. I wanted to write such a book. I still might some day, but I don't think it will happen any time soon. Thus, I am going to write a few blogs dealing with the main Scripture passages that seem to support Calvinism. This one, as you can tell, is on Romans 9.

John Sanders rightfully states that double predestination is what happens "when Romans 9 is divorced from its historical setting and universalized into a timeless truth."(1) Indeed, it is because this chapter has been read the way it has since Augustine that it seems to obviously support double predestination. Rather than dealing with the topic of individual salvation, James Dunn provides, Paul here "is thinking solely in terms of salvation-history, of God’s purpose for Israel."(2) He is talking about Israelites, addressing their history and their future, and is defending God's righteousness and faithfulness in his dealings with them: "It is not as though the word of God has failed" (v.6). With that, let's dive in:

11-16: For when they were not yet born nor had done anything good or evil, in order that the purpose of God should stand in terms of election, not from works but from him who calls, it was said to her, "The elder will serve the younger," as it is written: "Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated."

What then shall we say? There is no injustice with God, is there? Certainly not! For to Moses he says, "I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will show compassion to whom I show compassion." So then, it is not a matter of one who wills or the one who runs, but of God who shows mercy.

With this passage, rather than supporting the doctrine of arbitrary or unconditional election, Paul is making known that the election of the Israelites never had anything to do with what they did: "not from works . . . not a matter of one who wills or the one who runs." Dunn states Paul here is using Israel's own scriptures on their election to refute the idea that their "obedience to the law . . . was a factor in sustaining their covenant status before God."(3) He is making known that their election was solely an act of God's mercy and compassion. One would have to read the Calvinist doctrine of unconditional election into the text, because Paul is not referring to all the elect people in Christ, he is talking about elect Israel.

17-23: For the scripture says to Pharaoh, "For this purpose I raised you up, in order that I might demonstrate in you my power and in order that my name might be proclaimed in all the earth." So then, to whom he wills he shows mercy, but whom he wills he hardens. [I explore this last verse in my blog on divine hardening here]

You will say to me then: "Why does he still find fault? For who has resisted his will?" On the contrary, who are you, man, who answers back to God? Does the thing made say to its maker, Why have you made me thus? Or does the potter not have the right over the clay to make from the same lump one vessel for honorable use and another for dishonorable use? But what if God, willing to demonstrate his wrath and to make known his power, bore with much patience the vessels of wrath made ready for destruction, in order that he might make known the wealth of his glory on vessels of mercy which he prepared beforehand for glory?

It is no coincidence that Paul brings up both the rejection of Esau and the hardening of Pharaoh within a few verses of each other. Dunn provides, "God's redemption of Israel from Egypt meant that Pharaoh had filled the same sort of antithetical role" as that of Esau, who became the counterpart to his brother when Jacob was chosen and he was not.(4) Paul is using these examples to build up to a point, and that point is this:

The antithetical role filled by Esau and Pharaoh in relation to Israel's election and redemption is now being filled by the bulk of Israel in relation to God's calling of Gentile as well as Jew through the gospel.(5)

Whereas, before, Esau was the counterpart to Jacob's chosenness and Pharoah was hardened, now Israel is the counterpart to the inclusion of the Gentiles and they are hardened. In this, God remains faithful because the gospel was always the goal of God's covenant.(6) Israel is the one who failed by rejecting the gospel. Thus, Paul's question, "Who are you who answers back to God?" is valid, since the "disobedient and obstinate" Israelites (Rom. 10:21) are the ones who are questioning God's treatment of them.

The 'vessels of wrath' are "the bulk of the covenant people who have rejected the community/fulfillment of the covenant in the gospel."(8) The 'vessels of mercy', then, are the Gentile as well as Jew recipients of the gospel.

Vessels of wrath are not arbitrarily chosen by God before time to be prepared for destruction; nowhere is that provided. Vessels of wrath are such vessels because they made themselves that way. This is indicated by the potter and clay quotation from Isaiah, in which Israel was defying God's will (Is. 29). It is also indicated by the statement, God "bore with much patience the vessels of wrath" (v.22). In 10:21, Paul makes this point a second time, quoting Isaiah again, "All day long I have held out my hands to a disobedient and obstinate people." Why would God have to bear with much patience a people that he molded to be vessels of wrath? Why would he hold out his hands all day long to a people he made disobedient and obstinate? It would simply not make any sense at all.

Additionally, we must also consider the nature of God's wrath. I explore this topic more here and here, but suffice it to say, Romans 1:18-32 shows us, "God's wrath comes upon man's rebellion. . . . [M]an cannot escape responsibility for his fitness for destruction; on the contrary, in striking free from God he assumed the primary responsibility for what he became."(9)

Paul's point is that God can deal with the Israelites however he wills, and that he is righteous and faithful in his judgment. They have been hardened because they made themselves vessels of wrath, just as Pharoah was hardened because he made himself a vessel of wrath.

However, vessels of wrath do not have to stay that way. This is indicated by the use of the potter analogy, which Dunn states was most likely a "deliberate echo of the most famous of the scripture's potter passages (Jer. 18:1-11) [and] would be an invitation to his Roman readers to recognize that the divine purpose could be tempered and changed, that the pot made for a disreputable use could be remade into a work to be treasured."(10) Here is the potter passage in Jeremiah:

Jeremiah 18:1-10: This is the word that came to Jeremiah from the Lord: “Go down to the potter’s house, and there I will give you my message.” So I went down to the potter’s house, and I saw him working at the wheel. But the pot he was shaping from the clay was marred in his hands; so the potter formed it into another pot, shaping it as seemed best to him.

Then the word of the Lord came to me. He said, “Can I not do with you, Israel, as this potter does?” declares the Lord. “Like clay in the hand of the potter, so are you in my hand, Israel.

If at any time I announce that a nation or kingdom is to be uprooted, torn down and destroyed, and if that nation I warned repents of its evil, then I will relent and not inflict on it the disaster I had planned. And if at another time I announce that a nation or kingdom is to be built up and planted, and if it does evil in my sight and does not obey me, then I will reconsider the good I had intended to do for it.

Robert Chisholm comments on this passage: "there is no room for fatalistic determination here, for the 'clay' is depicted as exercising its own will, prompting an appropriate response from the divine 'potter.'"(11) The potter responds to the clay and adapts to its movements. Paul and his readers definitely would have thought of this passage in response to the use of the potter and clay metaphor--something that was most likely intentional on Paul's part.

Indeed, Paul even echoes the Jeremaic understanding of the potter and the clay metaphor in II Timothy. Here is a comparison of his use of the metaphor in Romans 9 and in II Timothy:

Romans 9:21: Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one object (σκεῦος) for honorable (τιμὴν) use and another for dishonorable (ἀτιμίαν) use?

II Timothy 2:20: In a large house there are utensils (σκεύη) not only of gold and silver but also of wood and clay, some for honorable (τιμὴν) use, some for dishonorable (ἀτιμίαν).

σκεῦος / σκεύη = object (or vessel, or utensil)
τιμὴν = honorable
ἀτιμίαν = dishonorable

These two verses are virtually making the same point: there are vessels made for honorable use and others made for dishonorable use. But Paul continues in II Timothy to say this:

2:21: All who cleanse themselves of the things I have mentioned will become honorable (τιμήν) utensils (σκεῦος), dedicated and useful to the owner of the house, ready for every good work.

If we apply the understanding of the Jeremiah passage and the II Timothy passage to Romans 9--which we have no reason not to do--all notions of double predestination disappear entirely. It becomes clear that vessels of wrath are not that way because of some divine decree, but because of their own actions.

It also shows Paul did not think vessels of wrath had to stay vessels of wrath. As Dunn provides, Romans 2:1-3:20 (and I would add 11:11-24) shows us "being outside the elect people of God is no guarantee of final condemnation, just as being inside the elect people of God is no guarantee of final justification."(12)

In fact, Paul writes so that the vessels of wrath will not stay fit for destruction! He says just a few verses later, "Brothers and sisters, my heart’s desire and prayer to God for the Israelites is that they may be saved" (10:1).

So here is the overall flow of Paul's message to the Israelites:

1) The covenant people were not chosen because of anything that they did (vv.11-12, 16), but their call to election was solely based on God's mercy and compassion (vv.15-16).

2) The roles that Esau and Pharaoh played in the salvation-history of Israel are now being filled by Israel herself in the coming of the gospel to the Gentiles. God chose Jacob over Esau and used Pharaoh's obstinate state to further his purposes for Israel, and now he is choosing the gospel over obstinate Israel and is using Israel's obstinate state to further his purposes for the world, "in order that he might make known the wealth of his glory on vessels of mercy which he prepared beforehand for glory" (v.23). God prepared beforehand the gospel and that it would be presented "not only [to] the Jews but also [to] the Gentiles" (v.24; see also vv.25-26).

3) Paul emphasizes that God retains the right to do all of this, because he is the Creator, the Potter (v.18-21). However, it does not have to stay that way. At the beginning of chapter 10, Paul says his purpose is for Israel to be saved. If the vessels of wrath alter their behavior and embrace the will of God, they can be vessels of mercy.

It has been made clear that Romans 9 is not at all referring to predestination or individual salvation. Nothing in the text provides it. When you read the chapter with the understanding of its intended purpose for its intended audience, all notions of Calvin's doctrines fade away. I encourage you to read chapters 9-11 with this understanding and see how well the pieces fit together.
________________

This was just a general overview of the argument in Romans 9. If you want to research further, here are several places you can go:

• Cranfield, C. E. B. The Epistle to the Romans. Vol. 2. New York: T&T Clark, 2002.
• Dunn, James D. G. Romans 9–16. Vol. 38B of Word Biblical Commentary. Edited by David A. Hubbard, and Glenn W. Barker. Dallas: Word Books, 1988.
• Jewett, Robert. Romans. Vol. 2. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 2006.
• Sanday, William, and Arthur C. Headlam. A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, 5th ed. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1902. 
• Sanders, John. "Romans 9-11." In The God Who Risks, rev. ed. (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2007), 127-130. This is another general overview, but a good one. 
• Shellrude, Glen. "The Freedom of God in Mercy and Judgment: a Libertarian Reading of Romans 9:6-29." Evangelical Quarterly 81, no. 4 (October 1, 2009): 306-318. 
• White, Charles Edward. "John Calvin's Five-Point Misunderstanding of Romans 9: an Intertextual Analysis." Wesleyan Theological Journal 41, no. 2 (September 1, 2006): 28-50. 
• Wright, N.T. The Climax of the Covenant (Philadelphia: Fortress press, 1992), 231-257.

Notes:
(1) John Sanders,The God Who Risks, rev. ed. (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2007), 129.
(2) James D.G. Dunn, Romans 9-16, Vol. 38B of Word Biblical Commentary, eds. David A. Hubbard and Glenn W. Barker (Dallas: Word Books, 1988), 562.
(3) Ibid., 562-563.
(4) Ibid., 563.
(5) Ibid.
(6) Dunn says that Paul highlights "the continuity of the gospel with God's covenant election." Ibid., 568.
(7) Dunn states that Paul's "focus remains fixed primarily on the problems causes . . . by Israel's rejection of the gospel."Ibid., 566.
(9) Ibid., 567.
(10) Ibid.
(11) Robert B. Chisholm, Jr., Handbook on the Prophets (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002), 177.
(12) Dunn, 564.

Why I Am an Open Theist

In case you haven't gotten this in my past blogs, I am an open theist. This entails many things, but the one that is distinct from other Christian views is the belief that, to God, the future is made up of possibilities and not exact certainties. Thus, God does not possess exhaustive foreknowledge (Click here if you want more information). I came to this conclusion about a year and a half ago. Here, I will not discuss all the ins and outs of how I view God's foreknowledge, but I would simply like to share why I came to this conclusion.

Because the Bible Tells Me So

I originally decided on open theism while taking a class on the Prophets. I was writing about the suffering of God in Jeremiah and I picked up Terence Fretheim's book The Suffering of God. In my reading of Jeremiah, I was struck by 26:3: "Perhaps they will listen and everyone will turn from his evil way, that I may repent of the calamity which I am planning to do to them because of the evil of their deeds." I realized that there are many verses just like this, where God says "If" or "Perhaps" in such a way that it suggests that he does not exactly know what the outcome will be. I saw that Fretheim had a chapter on the subject of God's uses of these words, and so I read it. I didn't know then that Fretheim is an open theist (nor did I know what open theism was), but when I read his chapter, I highlighted so much of it because it made so much sense to me.

It is important to note that the deciding factor for me had nothing to do with whether or not God's foreknowledge limits human freedom (which is what it was for most open theists). That idea hadn't even crept into my mind at that point. My decision was solely based on the passages of Scripture in which God doesn't seem to know exactly what is going to happen.

That being said, once I accepted the view, several other elements came into the picture.

The Traditional View Limits God's Freedom

The more I thought about the idea of God's exhaustive foreknowledge, the less I agreed with it. I read Clark Pinnock's chapter about open theism in Predestination & Free Will: Four Views. In it, he supports the idea that if God has exhaustive foreknowledge of the future, then humans do not have free will. At that point, I didn't agree or disagree with that position. I was never bothered by the idea of God's foreknowledge and my free will.

The idea that did bother me was that if God has foreknowledge, then it limits his freedom. Think about it. If God knows exactly how things are going to turn out, then he knows exactly how he is going to interact with the world for the rest of time. Furthermore, since he cannot be wrong in his knowledge of the future, he has to interact with the world in the future the way that he sees it. He can do nothing else but what he sees himself doing in the future. Thus, God's freedom is limited.

God: Past, Present, and Future?

Many would disagree with the last section because they look at the God-time relationship in a completely different manner. Past, present, and future, in their minds, are all present to God in the "eternal now." What we call past, God is experiencing as present; what we call future, God is experiencing as present. Time is a book, or a movie, with a beginning, middle and end. Since God is outside of time, and since he is omnipotent, they believe he is in every page, every moment, all at once. This view assumes that time is already completed--that the future has already been resolved and we are just living out a part of the completed product of time.

I do not view time this way. I view time more like an unfinished painting. God started the painting at the beginning of time, and equipped us with a brush and paint with which we can paint our futures. Yet, we live inside the painting (thus, not the best analogy. But what analogy could properly describe God's relationship with time?). God doesn't live inside the painting, he is beyond it. He transcends it, and yet is immanent in it. Unlike us, he is not bound by the canvas or the frame. That being said, the painting is unfinished, so there is still a past, present, and future of the painting--even to God, precisely because he created it that way.

The idea that the past, present, and future are all present to God is, to me, completely nonsensical. We definitely do not get this concept from Scripture. In Scripture, we see God in time living with his people, experiencing a past and a present and looking at a future. This doesn't mean that God is not also outside of time, but being outside of time doesn't have to me mean what many think it does. Supposing that God is in past, present, and future all at once puts a distance between him and his time-bound people. As 19th century theologian Isaak Dorner states, "the living participation of God in the world, his living communion of love with it, depends in fact upon our positing that God knows continually what is now present and that he does not have to the present simply the relation which he also has to the past and the future, as if these were just as much present for him as the former, since that would lead to a very lifeless and inadequate relation."

Does God's Foreknowledge Limit Human Freedom?

Like I said before, when I first agreed with open theism, it had nothing to do with the idea that God's foreknowledge means we can't have free will. That being said, I have now come to that conclusion.

That I have free will means that, though I chose to write this blog, given the same circumstances 30 minutes ago, I could choose not to write the blog but could go do something else. To have free will means I can choose to do whatever I want, that I am not bound to one choice.

Let us say that God knows that on January 21st, 2048, Robert Smith will go see a movie. Because God's knowledge must be true, that has to happen. When the day comes and Robert is given the choice to either go see a movie or stay home, Robert has to go see a movie. He can do nothing else. His free will is limited to that one option. Thus, though subjectively it may seem that we have free will, we objectively do not have free will because our future choices are bound to God's definite knowledge of them.

This could have (and maybe should have) been longer. I haven't included all the elements of open theism, nor I have explained in detail what my view of God's foreknowledge is, but, like I said at the top, I just wanted to share with you why I came to this conclusion.

If you would like to discuss this topic with me more, we can definitely do that.

What makes a heretic? Part 2: John Piper and John Sanders

In open theism, describes John Sanders, 

  God has flexible strategies. Though the divine nature does not change, God reacts to contingencies, even adjusting his plans, if necessary, to take into account the decisions of his free creatures. God is endlessly resourceful and wise in working towards the fulfillment of his ultimate goals. Sometimes God unilaterally decides how to accomplish these goals but he usually elicits human cooperation such that it is both God and humanity who decide what the future shall be. God's plan is not a detailed script or blueprint, but a broad intention that allows for a variety of options regarding precisely how his goals may be reached.(1)

Also, 

  the omniscient God knows all that is logically possible to know. I call this "dynamic omniscience" in that God knows the past and present with exhaustive definite knowledge and knows the future as partly definite (closed) and party indefinite (open). God's knowledge of the future contains knowledge of what God has decided to bring about unilaterally (that which is definite), knowledge of possibilities (that which is indefinite) and those events that are determined to occur (e. g. an asteroid hitting a planet). Hence, the future is partly open or indefinite and partly closed or definite. God is not caught off-guard since he has foresight, anticipating what we will do. Also, it is not the case that just anything may happen, for God has acted in history to bring about events in order to achieve his unchanging purpose. Graciously, however, God invites us to collaborate with him to bring the open part of the future into being.(2)

In a chapter against open theism, John Piper--a very popular and respected Calvinist who was highly inspired by Jonathan Edwards--refers to a story of a young woman whose husband abandoned her. Why would God let me marry him if He knew he would abandon me? she wondered. In order to comfort her and help her keep her faith, her open theist pastor explained to her that God did not know that that was going to happen. 

Piper uses his own story as a response to that.

A woman from his own congregation heard the first story and wrote him a letter responding to it. She said that worse had happened to her with her husband and she was comforted by the fact that God did know what was going to happen and that "God intends this whole thing for my good. It's not just that everything will turn out all right in the end; it's that right now he is working his purpose out in my life, to move me to the next degree of glory."

For this reason, among many others, Piper concludes that open theism is "theologically ruinous, dishonoring to God, belittling to Christ, and pastorally hurtful."(3)

Most evangelicals agree with Piper on this. In 2004, John Sanders lost his tenure and was booted out of  Huntington College because he is an open theist and, worse, a popular one.(4)
This was after being kicked out of the Evangelical Theology Society a year earlier for the same reason.(5)

Does anyone know of a Calvinist that was fired from a University or kicked out of the ETS for being a Calvinist? I sure don't.
Why?

Back to Piper's story.
I suppose it would be better to tell the lady, "Not only did God know about the fact that your husband would abandon you, he caused him to"..........

Somehow, it is better to say that God causes evil than to say that God doesn't know the entirety of the definite future.
Why is that the case?
Why is it that saying the future is partly indefinite to God's knowledge is synonymous with denying Christianity?
And why is it not the same for believing that God is the cause of evil? 
Why isn't Calvinism considered "theologically ruinous, dishonoring to God, belittling to Christ, and pastorally hurtful"? (It definitely is to me)

I would like to add that Sanders wouldn't deny that God is "working his purpose out" in the lady's life. He would say that God adapted to what her husband did and altered his glorious plans for her accordingly.


Notes:
(1) Sanders, John. "An Introduction to Open Theism." Reformed Review (Online) 60, no. 2 (March 1, 2007), 35.
(2) Ibid., 35-36.
(3) See John Piper, "Grounds for Dismay: The Error and Injury of Open Theism," in Beyond the Bounds: Open Theism and the Undermining of Biblical Christianity, eds. John Piper, Justin Taylor, and Paul Kjoss Helseth (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2003), 371-384.
(4) Stan Guthrie, "Open or Closed Case?" Christianity Today: http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2004/decemberweb-only/12-20-32.0.html
(5) Ted Olsen, "ETS Leadership Issues Recommendations on Kicking Out Open Theists." Christianity Today: http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2003/octoberweb-only/10-27-41.0.html